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Abstract
The support of location computation on mobile devices (e.g. mobile phones,
PDAs) has enabled the development of context-aware and especially location-
aware applications (e.g. Restaurant Finder, Friend Finder) which are becom-
ing the new trend for future software applications. However, fears regarding
security and privacy are the biggest barriers against their success. Espe-
cially, mobile users are afraid of the possible threats against their private
identity and personal data.
Within the M-Business research group at the University of Mannheim,
various security and privacy aspects of context-aware mobile business appli-
cations are examined in this thesis. After providing a detailed introduction
to context-aware applications, the security challenges of context-aware ap-
plications from the perspectives of different principals (i.e. mobile users,
the broker, service providers) are analyzed. The privacy aspects, the chal-
lenges, the threats and legal directives regarding user privacy are explained
and illustrated by real-life examples. The user-centric security architectures
integrated within context-aware applications are introduced as anonymity
and mobile identity management solutions. The M-Business security archi-
tecture providing security components for communication security, dynamic
policy-based anonymity, secure storage on mobile devices, identity manage-
ment for mobile users and cryptography libraries is explained in detail. The
LaCoDa compiler which automatically generates final Java code from high
level specifications of security protocols is introduced as a software-centric
solution for preventing developer-specific security bugs in applications.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Funktionalita¨t der Positionsbestimmung auf mobilen Gera¨ten (z.B. PDAs,
Handys) unterstu¨tzt die Entwicklung kontext- und besonders ortsbezogener
Anwendungen (z.B. Restaurant-Finder, Freund-Finder), die sich als neuer
Trend auf dem Softwaremarkt abzeichnen. Eine wesentliche Barriere fu¨r
den kommerziellen Erfolg dieser Anwendungen sind jedoch die Sorgen der
Benutzer um ihre Sicherheit und Privatspha¨re. Besonders mobile Benutzer
fu¨rchten die Preisgabe ihrer Identita¨t und ihrer perso¨nlichen Daten.
Die vorliegende Arbeit ist im Umfeld der Mobile Business Forschungs-
gruppe an der Universita¨t Mannheim entstanden und betrachtet verschiedene
Sicherheitsaspekte kontextbezogener Mobile Business Anwendungen. Im
Anschluss an eine detaillierte Definition und Beschreibung kontextbezogener
Anwendungen werden deren Sicherheitsrisiken aus der Perspektive von mo-
bilen Benutzern, Brokern und Dienstanbietern untersucht. Die verschiede-
nen Aspekte der Privatspha¨re, zugeho¨rige Risiken und Bedrohungen sowie
gesetzliche Vorschriften werden erla¨utert und mit Beispielen aus der Praxis
illustriert.
Im na¨chsten Schritt werden benutzerbezogene Sicherheitsarchitekturen
vorgestellt, die in kontextbezogene Anwendungen als Lo¨sungen fu¨r Anonymi-
ta¨t und mobiles Identita¨tsmanagement integriert werden ko¨nnen. Darauf
aufbauend wird eine Mobile Business Sicherheitsarchitektur beschrieben, die
verschiedene Sicherheitskomponenten fu¨r Kommunikationssicherheit, dyna-
mische policybasierte Anonymita¨t, sichere Datenhaltung auf mobilen Gera¨ten,
mobiles Identita¨tsmanagement und kryptographische Bibliotheken bereit-
stellt. Schließlich wird der kryptographische Compiler LaCoDa diskutiert,
der Spezifikationen kryptographischer Protokolle automatisch in Java-Code
u¨bersetzt und damit das Risiko implementationsbedingter Sicherheitslu¨cken
verringert.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Home users became acquainted with the Internet from the middle of the 90’s
by surfing static web pages, checking e-mails and chatting with friends. In
the Internet era, the technology has rapidly progressed. Today even small
mobile devices such as mobile phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs)
can even be used to communicate over the Internet. Additionally, wireless
communication techniques (i.e. Wlan, Bluetooth, GPRS/UMTS, etc.) have
been considerably improved. Mobility has introduced mobile applications.
In spite of their limitations such as small screen size, low processor power and
restricted battery life time, mobile devices running mobile applications have
gained a large degree of acceptance among end users. Technology producers
have also realized the huge business potential implicit within the mobile
community. Today, context-aware applications that facilitate the context
data (e.g. location, time, velocity, etc.) of mobile users for enabling services
are the new trend for future mobile business applications. Service providers
and telecommunication providers are already focusing on extending their
infrastructures and developing applications in order to support mobile users
so they may have the benefit of context-aware and especially location-aware
applications.
Locating kids [34] and people in emergency [39], locating moving objects
(e.g. fleet management) [20], location-based chat and games [40], indoor
and outdoor routing [30], locating nearby restaurants, cinemas and gas sta-
tions are examples of already implemented context-aware and location-aware
mobile business applications. A general view of context-aware mobile appli-
cations is depicted in Figure 1.1. In such applications, mobile user’s context
data such as current location, time, weather, profile, etc. are considered by
service providers while the mobile users holding their PDAs are interested
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in getting the service that best fits their current context.
Security has been always considered as being of major importance in
the digital world. Security risks are present in all communications over the
Internet. In the newspapers, radios, TVs and Internet media, many security
breaches have been experienced causing business failures, financial loss and
privacy violations (see Section 4.3). Even prison sentences as a punishment
have become common in many situations [2, 57, 61]. For the continuing
success of any business, data security is very important. Based on the ques-
tionnaires completed by a sample of mobile device users, it can be confirmed
that security of personal data is the most critical issue for these users. As
a conclusion, considering context-aware applications in which very sensitive
location data is exchanged between the communicating parties, security and
privacy of personal context data can be looked upon as being a major barrier
against the potential successful implementation and acceptance of mobile
business applications.
Figure 1.1: A Vision of Context-aware Mobile Applications1
Even though high-level mobile devices exist and wireless mobile commu-
nication methods have been improved, the development process of mobile
business applications is quite young and is an open research issue. The
Mobile Business Research Group [66] at the University of Mannheim has
1Referenced from http://www.m-business.uni-mannheim.de/SALSA/Overview.htm
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focused on designing and developing a generic platform and server/client
components for context-aware and especially location-aware mobile business
applications since September 2004. As a participant in the research group,
we have studied the security aspect in depth by analyzing the possible se-
curity and privacy threats for the main principals (i.e. the broker, mobile
users and service providers) and designing and developing the required secu-
rity protocols and components in terms of user-centric and software-centric
solutions.
1.1 Mannheim Mobile Business Research Group
With the future trend towards mobile applications, the Mobile Business Re-
search Group was formed at the University of Mannheim in Germany. The
main focus of the research group is context-aware and especially location-
aware mobile business applications. More concretely, we aim at designing a
generic framework for context-aware applications. The framework provides
the required infrastructure and server/client components in order to realize
and deploy a specific context-aware application easily and rapidly.
Initially, there were 7 research chairs involved in the activities of the re-
search group from the departments of computer science (Ger. Informatik),
information systems (Ger. Wirtschaftsinformatik) and business adminis-
tration (Ger. Betriebswirtschaftslehre). So far, the research group has
completed the SALSA [56] and LAMBADA [35] projects successfully. The
SALSA project (Software Architectures For Location-Specific Transactions
in Mobile Commerce) aimed at creating an advanced infrastructure for de-
veloping and deploying location-based mobile commerce applications. It
was supported by the State of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg [36]. The LAMBADA
project (Location-Aware Mobile Business Adhoc Architecture) focused on
technology development for location-based and context-based mobile busi-
ness applications and was supported by the Ministry of Science, Research
and Arts of the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
The research chairs and their contributions to the M-Business group can
be summarized as follows:
• Chair of Software Technology (Prof. Dr. Colin Atkinson) [156]: Ser-
vice Discovery is the focus of this research group. The problem of
discovering location-based services dynamically has been studied. De-
veloping location-based services within the context of service-oriented
architectures, the development of algorithms for finding and evaluat-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
ing services and matching them to user requirements are all activities
which have been implemented by the group.
• Chair of Multimedia and Network Technology (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Ef-
felsberg) [161]: This research group deals with position determination
for mobile devices. The existing localization technologies, especially
the technologies for outdoor localization (i.e. GPS) and indoor local-
ization (i.e. WLAN) have been analyzed. The research group also
developed other localization algorithms for PDAs using GPS, WLAN
and Bluetooth technologies.
• Chair of Database Technology (Prof. Dr. Guido Moerkotte) [158]:
Developing ontology for describing location information is the main
focus of this research group. The database has been developed by
using the location ontology for places as a schema.
• Chair of Theoretical Computer Science (Prof. Dr. Matthias Krause,
Prof. Dr. Stefan Lucks2) [160]: The research group has been involved
in analyzing the security challenges in the M-Business framework, de-
veloping the required security components and providing the required
cryptographic libraries for confidential communication and secure stor-
age.
• Chair of Information System III (Prof. Dr. Dr. Martin Schader,
Dr. Markus Aleksy) [157]: The research group has analyzed the ex-
isting technologies and software engineering methods for dynamic re-
configuration of applications. Other contributions were finding new
approaches and technologies that support the flexibility of mobile ap-
plications.
• Chair of Business Administration and Information Systems (Prof. Dr.
Armin Heinzl) [155]: The goal of this research group is the selection
of a generic application scenario for context-based applications using
mobile technologies. The emphasis is on examining how the service-
oriented, location-based and semantic aspects of location-based ser-
vices can be incorporated in the conceptual design.
• Chair of Business Administration and Marketing II (Prof. Dr. Hans H.
Bauer) [159]: Analyzing of location-based applications from the user
requirements perspective has been the main concern of this research
2Prof. Lucks has meanwhile moved to the Bauhaus University of Weimar.
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Figure 1.2: Interaction of Security and Other Research Groups
group. Especially, the existing literature with a business focus has
been analyzed in detail and a catalog of user requirements has been
prepared.
Interactions between the research chairs have been necessity within the
M-Business projects. As the security group, we have assisted different groups
in providing support for the security aspects of their projects as shown in
Figure 1.2. Privacy and confidentiality of location information is required
from the networking group. Separation of business and security aspects
and policy-based service-oriented architectures are important requirements
to be met by the software group. Integrity of databases, authentication and
authorization of database modifications are required by the database group.
Usability is a requirement from the business administration group and trust
management is a requirement from the information systems group.
After completing the projects SALSA and LAMBADA successfully, the
research group has started working on the GEM project [22] (Generic Envi-
ronment for Mobile Business) which is supported by “Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft (DFG)” [14]. The project analyzes potential benefits and fac-
tors of adoption and acceptance as well as the development of technological
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components for a generic reference architecture to support several kinds of
key mobile business applications.
1.2 Security and Privacy
Security aims to protect information and information systems from unau-
thorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction3.
Privacy enables an individual or group to safeguard information about them-
selves and prevent their unintended release to others or to attackers.
Security and privacy are the non-functional requirements of a system, but
they have a very critical role for the acceptance of the system. Considering
context-aware applications in which a large quantity of personal user data
is exchanged between the principals, security and privacy become inevitable
and paramount. It can even be the case that a business can fail if the
required countermeasures are not in place.
The M-Business research group has aimed at constructing a generic
framework that fulfills the requirements of different context-aware appli-
cations. Security should be also a part of this framework. The security
analysis should be done in order to specify the possible threats against the
different principals (i.e. the broker, mobile users and service providers).
Based on the results of the analysis, the required security protocols should
be designed and the required security components should be developed and
integrated within the M-Business generic framework.
Within the scope of security management tasks, the following security
aspects have been studied:
• Security Analysis: In the analysis phase, the security threats in the
M-Business framework and the possible solution mechanisms against
these threats were specified. The results were published within a sci-
entific paper [189] and presented in the M-Business workshop [65] in
the poster session.
• Security Questionnaire: The Business Administration and Market-
ing II group [159] prepared a questionnaire for mobile users in order
to get to know their opinions on different topics such as usability, use-
fulness and also security to enhance applications in the M-Business
framework. We contributed to this questionnaire by integrating our
security analysis results within the questionare.
3Referenced from U.S. Code Collection Definitions -
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode44/usc sec 44 00003542- - - -000-.html
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• Privacy Exploits: People may not realize the importance of their
privacy unless their privacy is threatened or violated. If someone en-
dangers their privacy, they would react vigorously. We have used the
technique “Google Hacking” [24] for revealing sensitive cryptographic
secrets (e.g. username-passwords, secret keys, private keys, encrypted
messages, etc.) and personal confidential documents (e.g. confidential
emails, forum postings, etc.). A tool namely TrackingDog [137] was
also developed for making the Google searches automatically. This
work has shown that users involved with context-aware applications
should also be equipped with the relevant PETs (privacy enhancing
tools) in order to protect themselves and guarantee their privacy.
• User-centric Solutions: Anonymity, location privacy, mobile iden-
tity management and trust management were the main security con-
cerns for the user-centric solutions. We have designed an anonymity
architecture [188, 190] and developed the anonymity components for
enabling mobile user to communicate anonymously with the broker
and service providers. We have designed a mobile identity manage-
ment system that supports location privacy by blurring in levels and
trust management by utilizing the P3P protocol [51]. P3P originally
targets only Internet browsing, but not very suitable for integration
directly within context-aware applications. The shortcomings of P3P
for context-aware applications were analyzed and published in a scien-
tific paper [185]. For software development, the M-Business research
group use Java technologies. The Java security APIs do not run, how-
ever, very efficiently on mobile devices. We therefore ported cryptlib
security library [10] on ARM-processors and this enabled very fast
execution of security algorithms.
• Software-centric Solutions: Application developers cause many se-
curity bugs in implementations. They are not security experts and can
easily make errors and endanger the security of their implementations.
Buffer overflows, SQL injections and XSS injections are typical exam-
ples of such implementation errors. To eliminate these implementation
bugs, we have aimed to automate this process. The LaCoDa compiler
[181] we developed provides a specification language. The developer
just encodes the relevant security or cryptography protocol for the La-
CoDa in its specification language and it then creates the final Java
source code. In the near future, it will support more languages - such
as C, Ada and even the formal verification languages.
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1.3 Thesis Structure and Contributions
1.3.1 Content
This thesis emphasizes the fundamentals of context-aware and location-
aware applications, security and privacy analysis of applications within the
M-Business framework and the security architecture (i.e. security compo-
nents, libraries) integrated within the framework. User-centric proposed so-
lutions (i.e. anonymity, privacy, identity management) and software-centric
proposed solutions (i.e. automatics code generation from security protocols)
are explained and illustrated with concrete examples in the thesis in detail.
The thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 explains the definitions of some common terms like con-
text, context-awareness and location-awareness. The differences be-
tween electronic business, mobile business and mobile commerce are
explained. Existing context-aware and location-aware applications are
introduced. The main principals and the different types and cate-
gorization of context-aware applications are also mentioned in this
chapter. Two target demo applications (i.e. Restaurant Finder and
Friend Finder) are introduced. Finally, the chapter concludes with an
explanation of the location determination techniques for outdoor and
indoor applications.
• Chapter 3 explains the main objectives (i.e. confidentiality, integrity
and availability) in terms of security and the security challenges in
context-aware applications from the perspectives of the broker, mobile
users and service providers. Some additional security limitations are
given in the conclusion to this chapter.
• Chapter 4 focuses on privacy aspects. Privacy challenges of location-
aware applications and their legacy aspects are described in detail.
Real life privacy threats as detailed in the media are given as well. Fi-
nally, real life privacy threats are illustrated by using Google hacking
techniques which are used to reveal confidential and secret personal
information containing even private keys or private emails. The coun-
termeasures for Google hacking, the relevant tools and our penetration
testing tool, namely TrackingDog, are introduced at the end of this
chapter.
• Chapter 5 focuses on our user-centric solutions for M-Business secu-
rity architecture, anonymity and mobile identity management. The
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SALSA security architecture, which provides mechanisms and compo-
nents for secure communication, secure storage, anonymous commu-
nication and mobile identity management, is explained in detail. En-
hancements to the existing Mix-net based anonymity networks, new
aspects for mobile identity management from the context-aware ap-
plication perspective and the extensions to P3P privacy policies and
preferences are explained in this chapter.
• Chapter 6 mentions the common mistakes in software engineering from
the security perspective. It introduces our cryptography compiler La-
CoDa [181], which improves the software development process by au-
tomating Java code generation from high-level specifications of security
protocols. The architecture of the compiler, the syntax and features
of the specification language and concrete code generation examples
are explained in this chapter.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
1.3.2 Publications
The contents of this thesis are based on a number of publications by the
author, as follows:
Peer-Reviewed Papers:
1. E.I.Tatlı and S. Lucks: Mobile Identity Management Revisited. In
Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Security and Trust
Management, Trondheim-Norway, June 2008.
2. E.I.Tatlı: Privacy in Danger: Let’s google your privacy. In Proceed-
ings of the Third IFIP WG 9.2, 9.6/11.6, Series: IFIP International
Federation for Information Processing , Vol. 262, Simone Fischer-
Hu¨bner, Penny Duquenoy, Albin Zuccato, Leonardo Martucci (Eds.),
Boston: Springer, pp. 51-59, June 2008.
3. E. I. Tatlı: Google Hacking for Privacy, Third International Summer
School The Future of Identity in the Information Society, Karlstad-
Sweden, 6-10 August 2007.
4. E. I. Tatlı: Extending P3P/Appel for Friend Finder, The Interna-
tional Workshop on Privacy-Aware Location-based Mobile Services
(PALMS), Mannheim, 11 May 2007.
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5. E. I. Tatlı: Privacy in Context-aware Mobile Business Applications,
IADIS International Conference (E-Commerce ’06), Barcelona-Spain,
9-11 December 2006.
6. E. I. Tatlı: Context Data Model for Privacy, PRIME Standardization
Workshop, IBM Zu¨rich Research Center, 6-7 July 2006.
7. E.I. Tatlı, D. Stegemann and S. Lucks: Dynamic Anonymity. The
4th World Enformatika Conferences, International Conference on In-
formation Security (ICIS’05), Istanbul-Turkey, 2005.
8. S. Lucks, N. Schmoigl and E.I.Tatlı: Issues on Designing a Crypto-
graphic Compiler. WEWoRC (Western European Workshop on Re-
search in Cryptology), Leuven-Belgium, 2005.
9. E. I. Tatlı, D. Stegemann and S. Lucks: Security Challenges of Location-
Aware Mobile Business. The second IEEE International Workshop on
Mobile Commerce and Services (WMCS’05), Mu¨nchen-Germany, 19
July 2005.
Non-Reviewed Papers:
10. M. Kessler, S. Lucks, E. I. Tatlı: TrackingDog - A Privacy Tool against
Google Hacking, 7. Kryptotag, Bonn, 9. November 2007.
11. E. I. Tatlı: Google Reveals Cryptographic Secrets, Technical Report
of 1. Kryptowochende, Kloster Bronbach, 01-02 July 2006.
12. E. I. Tatlı, D. Stegemann and S. Lucks: Dynamic Mobile Anonymity
with Mixing, Technical Report, University of Mannheim, March 2006.
Chapter 2
Context-aware Applications
2.1 Common Terms
The common terms (i.e. context, context-awareness, location-awareness,
location-based, location-specific, mobile business, mobile commerce and elec-
tronic business) that are used through the thesis are explained in this section.
Additionally, the following questions are answered in order to understand
these terms and how they relate to each other:
- What is meant by the term context?
- What is context-awareness and location-awareness?
- What are the relations between the terms location-aware, location-
based and location-specific?
- What are the differences between context-aware and location-aware
applications?
- What is the difference between electronic business, mobile business,
electronic commerce and mobile commerce?
2.1.1 Context
No common definition of the term context exists in the literature. Abowd et
al. describe context as “any information that can be used to characterize the
situation of an entity” [85] and an entity is “a person, place or object that is
considered relevant to the interaction between the user and an application,
including the user and the application themselves”. Beresford defines four
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main context of an entity: identity, location, activity and time [97]. Ac-
cording to Schilit [168], a user’s context includes information such as health,
mood, schedule, level of mobility (e.g. scooter, bike and car) and location.
In context-aware applications, location information has such a domi-
nating position over other context data that the terms context-aware and
location-aware are mostly used interchangeably. Considering this misinter-
pretation, Schmidt et al. propose another model for the representation of
context data in their paper namely “There is more to context than loca-
tion” [169]. In their model as depicted in Figure 2.1, context can originate
from human factors or the physical environment. Human factors can be
categorized into three as user (his/her knowledge, characteristics, habits,
etc.), social environment (social interaction, etc.) and tasks (tasks engaged
in, general goals, etc.). The physical environment can be also divided into
three categories as conditions (light, auditory stimulus, temperature, etc.),
infrastructure (surroundings for computation and communication) and lo-
cation (absolute location, relative location, etc.).
The M-Business framework which supports different context-aware ap-
plications requires the managing of all context data involved in the appli-
cations. Static data (e.g. forename, surname, address, etc.), dynamic data
(velocity, light level, air pressure, etc.), entity relations, location, time and
user morale are all instances of context data and need to be supported by the
M-Business framework. Schmidt et al.’s data model meets our requirements
for the M-Business framework.
In contrast this model does not take any privacy aspect into consider-
ation. It has been extended and enhanced towards a more privacy aware
model [183]. This topic is explained in detail in Section 5.3.3.
Figure 2.1: Context Feature Space1
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2.1.2 Context-awareness
Dey defines a system as context-aware if “it uses context to provide relevant
information and/or services to the user, where relevancy depends on the
users task” [104]. That means context-aware applications use context as
input when delivering a service. This input can be either given explicitly by
users or explicitly retrieved and forwarded to service providers.
As a concrete example, a service which provides a list of particular restau-
rants for a given location and/or given preferences (e.g.non-smoking place) is
a typical context-aware application. The location information can either be
entered by the user or automatically computed (i.e. based on GPS, WLAN,
or Bluetooth technologies). Context-aware mobile applications are more
specialized types of context-aware applications. The users of context-aware
mobile applications utilize mobile devices (e.g. mobile phones and PDAs)
in order to receive services which are especially enhanced for mobile devices
and mobile users.
2.1.3 Location-awareness
Location-aware applications are a subset of context-aware applications, but
have their focus on location information. They may still retrieve other con-
text data, but their concentration on location makes them being called as
location-aware applications. The term location-aware is used even more
frequently than context-aware in the literature. This is to emphasize the
introduction of new functionalities dependent on the automatic retrieval of
location information. In addition to the term location-aware, the terms
location-based and location-sensitive are also used interchangeably in the
literature.
Even though the M-Business framework considers a very broad scope
of context data, the location data and therefore location-aware applications
have prime importance for our research and development project.
2.1.4 E-Business, M-Business and M-Commerce
Even though Electronic Business (E-Business), Mobile Business (M-Business)
and Mobile Commerce (M-Commerce) have certain similarities and are com-
monly used interchangeably in the literature, they all cover different appli-
cation areas.
1Referenced from [169]
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E-Business is defined as “broadly as any business process that relies on an
automated information system. Today, this is mostly done with Web-based
technologies” (from Wikipedia).
Mo¨hlenbruch and Schmieder compare M-Business and M-Commerce in
[144]: “As a new characteristic of E-business, M-Business enables devel-
opment of business processes through financial use of wireless transport
technologies over mobile devices and thus affects many E-Business domains
such as E-Commerce, E-Procurement, Supply Chain and Customer Rela-
tion Management. On the other hand, M-Commerce is involved only with
monetary transactions that are executed by wireless information transfer
using mobile devices”. Gerpott defines M-Business as “a generic term of M-
Commerce, but which covers additional support of non-financial exchange
processes in and between companies via mobile information services” [191].
Link and Schmidt define M-Commerce as “electronic supported develop-
ment of business communication and transaction processes via mobile end
devices” [123]. Nicolai and Petersmann comment on M-Business and M-
Commerce in [147]: “M-Business is understood as a subset of E-Business.
When E-Business activities are carried out via a mobile device over a mo-
bile network, then this is called M-Business. If the E-Commerce transactions
are carried out via mobile devices, this is called M-Commerce”. MacDon-
ald [136] summarizes M-Commerce as “making money through the phone”.
Based on these explanations, it can be concluded that M-Business is a subset
of E-Business, but its electronic transactions are only executed via mobile
devices. M-Commerce is also a subset of M-Business, but its electronic
transactions are only relevant to monetary transactions.
In conclusion, M-Business can be defined as business transactions over
mobile telecommunication networks that are executed via mobile devices
such as PDAs, mobile telephones, wireless-enabled laptops etc. By M-
Commerce, we denote the subset of M-Business that involves commercial
transactions, i.e. the exchange of material goods [167]. Selling books and
CD’s over the Internet is a well-known example of M-Commerce, whereas a
service for locating a person having a heart attack and sending an ambulance
to him/her would be considered as M-Business rather than M-Commerce.
2.2 Context-aware Mobile Business Applications
More advanced mobile devices will become part of our daily lives in the near
future. Many more context-aware and location-aware services will be imple-
mented, and many more mobile transactions will be executed over mobile
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Figure 2.2: The Function Logic of Context-aware Applications
networks. Context-aware applications can be deployed for very different ap-
plication logics (e.g. restaurant finder vs. fleet management). It is the case
that their principals are the same and their function logics are very similar.
2.2.1 Function Logic
In context-aware applications, three main principals exist: the broker, mobile
users and service providers.
Mobile users with mobile devices are interested in receiving M-Business
services. A service provider offers chargeable and/or free services for mo-
bile users and registers the service interfaces with the broker. The broker
maintains a repository of available services and provides mobile users with
the descriptions of services that are most suitable for the user according to
user’s preferences and context. For certain applications, it is also possible
that the broker takes in addition the role of a service provider and directly
offers services to mobile users. For data transmission, the framework utilizes
the services of infrastructure providers such as telecommunication utilities.
The function logic illustrated in Figure 2.2 works as follows:
1. Service providers apply to the broker in order to register their services
within the repository of the broker. In the case that the broker ap-
proves this application, the service becomes available to mobile users.
2. Mobile users choose a service category (e.g. restaurants) through the
interface of the application(s) running on their mobile devices and
query the broker for available services in this particular category. If
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the user is interested in location-based services, he/she sends his/her
location information to the broker along with the request. The user
also sends his/her profile, which represents personal preferences and
special interests.
3. Based on the profile, the broker determines the relevant services within
its repository and sends back the corresponding service descriptions. A
service description typically includes information about price, provider
location and quality descriptions.
4. Upon getting the service descriptions, the user decides on a service
and applies to the provider of this particular service.
5. The service provider charges the user (if appropriate), and provides
the service.
2.2.2 Pull vs. Push Services
Context-aware applications can be grouped as pull and push services ac-
cording as to how the service is conveyed to mobile users [194]. In pull
services, users find the relevant service provider with the help of the broker
and then request the service provider to obtain the service. In push services,
users find the relevant service provider via the broker as in pull services, but
afterwards request to “join” to a service and send regularly specific context
data such as location to the provider. The service providers use this context
data to deliver their services to the mobile users in the case of a certain
event occurring (related to the context data) or a certain time period has
elapsed.
2.2.3 Categorization
Based on the research results and existing literature analysis of Bauer et al.
[119], there are 6 types of context-aware applications as depicted in Table
2.1.
Tracking services cover exact localization of persons or objects. Child
tracking [34], localization of car drivers having accidents [37], blind guid-
ance systems [7], tracking of seniors/persons in need [70], localization of
friends, relatives, family members within the same geographical area [38],
location-based chats [40] and group management via tracking of group mem-
bers [27] are existing examples of person tracking services. Auto search [5],
mobile phone searching [44], automatic localization of taxis [94] and fleet
management [20] are the examples of existing object tracking services.
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Main Category Sub-categories
1- Tracking services
a) Person tracking services
b) Object tracking services
2- Navigation services
a) General navigation services
b) Special navigation services
3- Information services
a) General information services
b) Interactive information services
4- Communication services
a) B2C communication services
b) B2B communication services
5- Entertainment services
6- Transaction services
Table 2.1: Categorization of Context-aware Applications
Navigation services direct mobile users from their current location to a
target location. If the user specifies the target location specifically, then it
is a type of general navigation service. If the user is interested in being
navigated to a particular service destination (e.g. restaurants, gas stations,
etc.), then this is called a special navigation service. Adjustment of a traffic
routing plan [121] and indoor routing in fairs [31] are examples of general
navigation services. Navigation to near-by restaurants, shopping centers,
gas stations [45, 46] and ATM locators [4] are examples of special navigation
services.
Information services provide information relevant to the user’s current
location. With interactive information services, users can also react interac-
tively after receiving the information. As an example, users can order pizza
directly when they receive the details of the nearest pizza shops. Mobile
city guides [43], weather information [75], traffic information [71] and time-
tables of public transport with location plans and real-time information (e.g.
delays) [92] are examples of general information services. Event information
systems with location plans and friend-invite features [91] are an example
of an interactive information service.
Communication Services as B2C (business-to-client) and B2B (business-
to-business) aim at optimizing the communication possibilities between users
and business enterprises [107, 166].
Entertainment services include location-based games [41], location-based
radio, location-based storytelling, etc.
Transaction services occur when financial transactions are executed be-
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tween the principals. Automated ticketing [121], buying products from bill-
boards, and local advertisements are examples of transaction services.
2.3 Existing Projects
There are several existing research projects on context-aware and location-
aware applications. Their focus is not specifically M-Business oriented.
The aim of the Nexus project [47] is modeling the spatial world for a
variety of commercial and non-commercial context-aware applications by
collecting context information from a number of sensors placed around and
on stationary objects (e.g. streets, buildings) or mobile objects (e.g. people,
vehicles). Location information relating to the relevant objects is stored by
the central location service provider, and other objects or service providers
can search the location of particular objects. Securitywise, Nexus focuses
mostly on privacy issues. To control unauthorized access to location informa-
tion, a certificate-based access control solution based on SPKI (simple public
key infrastructure)[58] has been developed within Nexus. For querying the
location of an object, the requester must hold an authorization certificate
that is issued and digitally signed by this particular object. For personal
data management Nexus uses virtual IDs. The identity manager from [122]
is suggested for handling virtual IDs.
The WASP project [74] aims at developing a context-aware service plat-
form based on web services. The aim of the project is to make it easier for
service providers to manage their services and also easier for mobile users
to search for, find and receive the relevant services. WASP proposes a P3P-
based (Platform for Privacy Preferences) [51] architecture to guarantee the
privacy of mobile clients. The P3P protocol enables web users to be aware
of what kind of information is collected when they communicate with ser-
vice providers. P3P-enabled user agents get the requests from users and ask
the service providers for their P3P policy, and more specifically, what kind
information they require from the user. Upon receiving the P3P policy, the
agents compare the policy and the user privacy preferences. If there is no
conflict, the agents send the relevant data to the providers, get the responses
and forward them to the users.
The Nimbus project [48] provides a framework to support developers of
location-based services. It presents a common interface for location data and
hides the details of how location is captured. Switching between outdoor
positioning systems (e.g. GPS) and indoor positioning systems (e.g. based
on Bluetooth or WLAN) can be realized without affecting the context-aware
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Figure 2.3: SALSA Demo Application - Search Page
applications. From the security point of view, the focus of the Nimbus is
especially on network and communication security [93].
The OpenLS project [50] of the Open GIS consortium [68] provides com-
mon interfaces for the developers and providers of location-aware applica-
tions such as map and navigation applications.
The Nidaros framework [67] provides components for fast development
of location-aware applications, i.e. especially applications like location-
dependent advertisements, city guides and guides to tourist attractions.
2.4 Target Application Scenarios
Within the scope of SALSA project [56], the M-Business research group
has implemented a demo application for finding restaurants which are near
to mobile user’s current location in Mannheim and which fits in with the
user’s preferences. The aim of this demo was to show that the architectures,
methods and components (designed and developed within a generic context-
aware framework by the different research chairs) can be used to build up a
real-life application.
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Figure 2.4: SALSA Demo Application - Context Settings
2.4.1 Restaurant Finder
Restaurant Finder is a very typical context-aware application providing
gastronomy guide. It helps mobile users to locate the most suitable restau-
rants in the vicinity, based on user profiles and context data.
The SALSA demo application shown in Figure 2.3 provides Restaurant
Finder as a service. In the setup menu, mobile users can set main profile
and application configurations such as age, gender, GUI language, family
status etc. In the context menu shown in Figure 2.4, different context data
(e.g. location, education, credit card, free time, etc.) are displayed and
configured.
Figure 2.5 depicts how the interactions between the broker, mobile users
and restaurant providers are carried out. The broker is named Universal
SDS (service discovery service) within the Salsa architecture. A mobile
user who wishes to have a delicious lunch in a restaurant needs to use the
search menu. The profile containing user preferences such as non-smoker,
indoor/outdoor and restaurants within one kilometer radius are forwarded
to the universal SDS along with the user’s location. The universal SDS
gets this service request and searches for the relevant restaurant finders
within its repository. The Gastro Guide as a service provider has already
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Figure 2.5: SALSA Restaurant Finder Demo
signed a contract with fast food restaurants and cocktail bars and registered
their services to the universal SDS. Upon coming up with a list of matching
services, the universal SDS returns the list back to the mobile user. The
mobile user gets the list, decides on a specific restaurant and either reserves
a suitable table directly by using the mobile application on the device or
orders a delicious pizza to be delivered to the user’s current location.
Thanks to the extensible SALSA architecture, other applications are also
supported by the Salsa demo application. Event guide application provides
mobile users with the ability to search for concerts, exhibitions, sport events,
etc. Not only location information but also the available free time of users,
weather information and profile data matching different events are also taken
into consideration during the search process. The Tourist Guide application
provides context-based sightseeing tours. Bargain Hunter application can
offer users bargains and bonus coupons based on their context and location
data.
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Figure 2.6: Friend Finder Application
2.4.2 Friend Finder
Even though the SALSA project chose the Restaurant Finder application
(which is a type of pull service) as the demo application to develop, more
complicated applications were needed to illustrate the existing privacy and
security risks. Therefore, Friend Finder (which is a type of push service)
has been also within our focus. Unlike the Restaurant Finder, interactions
among mobile users are supported in the Friend Finder application and this
causes more privacy risks that need to be taken into consideration.
Friend Finder is an example of a “person locating” service and is a
location-aware application [28]. As illustrated in Figure 2.6, mobile users
participating in the Friend Finder service regularly send their location data
computed by their mobile devices to the central location provider and can
also query the location of their particular friend through the location provider.
2.5 Location Determination
Location information is the most important context data for context-aware
applications. It can be a concrete value (i.e. coordinates in 3D dimension)
or a relative position (e.g. room number or building number). Mobile de-
vices can discover their current geographical positions with the help of a
special hardware device. Computing the location can be categorized into
outdoor and indoor computing according to the underlying communication
infrastructure.
Outdoor computing relies mostly on the availability of satellite-based
positioning systems such as GPS (Global Positioning System) [124]. GPS
uses a constellation of between 24 and 32 geostationary satellites, which
transmit precise microwave signals. A GPS receiver receives these signals
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from different satellites, and calculates the current position coordinates by
timing the signals. In addition to location, receivers can determine their
speed, direction, and the current time. The EU-project Galileo [21] is an
alternative to GPS and is expected to be operational by 2013.
GPS is not very effective for indoor areas, since the communication be-
tween GPS receivers and satellites is very often broken and therefore location
is not always able to be determined. For indoor areas, the existing wireless
network infrastructures (i.e. WLAN, Bluetooth) often enable a cheaper and
more accurate computation of the location [153]. These technologies can
help mobile devices to determine their location relative to the location of
access points in indoor areas. There are at the present time a number of po-
sitioning systems for indoor areas such as Active Badge [196], Cricket [154]
and Easy Living [101].
For more information about positioning systems, please refer to [128].
Chapter 3
Security Analysis
3.1 Information Security Principles
The CIA triad consisting of confidentiality, integrity and availability are the
core principles of information security [180]. These principles are the main
requirements for secure systems and secure information management.
3.1.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality provides the protection of sensitive information from unau-
thorized access [99]. Similarly, the ISO (International Organization for Stan-
dardization) defines confidentiality as “ensuring that information is accessi-
ble only to those authorized to have access”.
As an example, mobile users of the restaurant finder application should
be able to send their credit card information (as sensitive information) to
their banks in a secure way, guarded against unauthorized disclosure for the
debit. Otherwise, an attacker eavesdropping the communication channel can
ascertain both the secret and private credit card data relating to the mobile
user. Similarly, service providers storing personal information such as name,
address, phone number of users within their databases must guarantee the
confidentiality of this information.
Confidentiality is enabled in practice thanks to modern cryptography,
i.e. symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques [173].
3.1.2 Integrity
Integrity guarantees the prevention of unauthorized modification of data
[174]. Both data that is kept on volatile or non-volatile storage and data
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that is in transit requires to maintain its integrity.
As an example, the payment details (i.e. payment amount, credit card
information) of mobile users in the Restaurant Finder application should not
be altered during the transactions between mobile users, service providers
and the banks. Additionally, as in the Friend Finder application, location
data should be protected against unauthorized modification.
3.1.3 Availability
Availability assures that information resources are all accessible to legitimate
users when required. DoS (Denial of Service) attacks [143] are the common
techniques to cause an information resource to become unavailable.
For example, with the Friend Finder application, mobile users send their
location data at regular intervals the location provider. Therefore, the loca-
tion provider is expected to be always accessible. In the Restaurant Finder
application, the bank’s resources are also expected to be always online in
order to prevent inconsistencies during payments.
3.2 Security Challenges
Considering context-aware applications, each principal, i.e. mobile users,
the broker and service providers or other third parties can be potential
attackers and threaten the security and privacy of the others. Therefore, the
security threats should be considered and evaluated from the perspectives
of all principals. In this section, details of analysis results regarding possible
security risks and their possible solutions are given. The analysis results
have been published in a scientific paper, namely “Security Challenges of
Location-based Mobile Business Applications” [189]. As Table 3.1 shows,
some challenges are common for each principal, whereas others are relevant
only for a particular principal.
Assuming the infrastructure providers to be regarded as untrustworthy
by all main principals and end-to-end security is enforced between the prin-
cipals; we will not consider infrastructure providers in further detail.
3.2.1 Content and Communication Anonymity
Anonymity ensures that a user may use a resource or service without dis-
closing his/her real-world identity [77]. Similarly to non-electronic business,
most users do not like to unnecessarily reveal their identity when requesting
a mobile business service. For example, a celebrity may not want others
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# Security Challenge U B SP
1 Content and communication anonymity + - -
2 Privacy of personal data + - -
3 Location-based spamming + + +
4 Integrity and authenticity of service descriptions and
results
+ + +
5 Authentication and authorization + + +
6 Confidentiality of the communication + + +
7 Confidentiality of locally stored data + - -
8 Secure software development + + +
9 Usability vs. Security + - -
10 Secure mobile payment and fair exchange + + +
11 Rogue access points and forged GPS-signals + - -
Table 3.1: List of Security Challenges
(U:User, B:Broker, SP:Service Provider, +:challenge, -:no challenge)
to know which film in which cinema he/she watches, but also less famous
people may not want others to learn what kind of books they buy and read.
Anonymity can be grouped as content and communication anonymity.
Content anonymity focuses on hiding identity at the application level, whereas
communication anonymity is related to the network level. If your real name
is known by service providers, your content anonymity is compromised and
your anonymity fails. Attacking your communication anonymity, service
providers can elicit your IP address and find out your real identity, your
location, etc. In order to provide anonymity, specific requirements for both
content and communication anonymity should be satisfied.
A partial solution to content anonymity is pseudonymity. Pseudonyms
are faked names like nicknames. When communicating with service providers,
users introduce themselves with their pseudonyms instead of their real iden-
tities. They can use even different pseudonyms for the same providers. Even
if a client uses pseudonyms for receiving services, each provider is likely to
obtain some partial information about the clients, e.g. their location at
the time the client requested the service or the company he/she works for.
Based on the gathered information, a provider may not be able to determine
the user’s identity on his/her own, but collaborating service providers who
are able to link the pseudonyms could eventually deduce the client’s identity
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from the data they have collected.
A more complete solution to content anonymity problem is identity man-
agement, i.e. letting the user retain control over their personal confidential
information [87]. Identity management enables users to limit the amount of
personal information revealed to certain providers or in certain applications.
If certain information is not required by service providers, but they ask for
data revealing identity or a profile, an identity management system should
prevent this and provide content anonymity. Some solutions exist already
for identity management on mobile platforms as explained in detail in Sec-
tion 5.3.1. However, context-aware applications have further requirements
for mobile identity management. For example, P3P [51] enables trust man-
agement in web surfing and its integration into mobile identity management
would be an enhancement. Similarly, blurring location information in levels
(e.g. city name instead of GPS coordinates) would also improve anonymity
and privacy. Considering the new requirements, we have contributed to
mobile identity management for context-aware applications as explained in
Section 5.3.
When users communicate directly with service providers, their personal
information (IP address, country, operating system and much more) [9] are
all released to service providers which can then use such information to
identify users and to profile them. Mix-net [103] based solutions [32, 106,
163] exist (see Section 5.2.1) that support unlinkability of transactions [77]
and thus provide communication anonymity. The anonymity level provided
by the existing solutions can vary depending on various parameters such
as mix number, time delay, dummy messages, etc. Additionally, in the
M-Business framework different users can have varying levels of anonymity
sensitivity (e.g. celebrity vs. normal user) and also different applications
can require varying anonymity levels (e.g. restaurant finder vs. mobile
dating) for the same user. Considering these new requirements, a policy-
based dynamic anonymity architecture is proposed as explained in Section
5.2.
3.2.2 Privacy of Personal Data
Regardless of whether content and communication anonymity can be guar-
anteed in the framework, users are generally concerned about revealing per-
sonal data [105], even if service providers are in practice unable to recon-
struct their identities from the information they receive. In addition to con-
ventional attributes such as name, address, phone and credit card number,
special interests etc., this is especially the case for context information such
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as the user’s location at a specific point in time. The location information is,
however, an essential input for any location-based service; a mobile dating
service, for example, is pointless if the clients are not willing to disclose their
location and some of their personal data.
Privacy of personal data should be supported by identity management
(i.e. before users release data) and trust management (i.e. after users release
data).
For identity management, Jendricke et al. present an identity manager
to control personal data sent from mobile devices through networks [122].
An identity manager provides an interface with which one creates different
virtual identifications (IDs), i.e. pseudonyms, and binds a subset of his/her
personal data to each ID. When communicating with a service provider,
the user chooses an ID that is suitable for this particular type of commu-
nication. Before any personal data is sent to a service provider, the user is
explicitly asked to allow the transmission. This is discussed in Section 5.3.1
in detail and the enhancements required for mobile identity management
are explained in Section 5.3.2.
In most cases, identity managers can ensure that each provider gets just
as much personal information as needed for supplying the service requested,
but how can service providers be prevented from abusing the legally collected
information?
Obviously, on the technical level, the framework cannot control the fur-
ther usage of information, once it has been transmitted to service providers.
Abuse of gathered personal information for profiling etc. has to be pro-
hibited on the business level, e.g. by establishing a Privacy Management
Code of Practice that is obligatory for all service providers registering with
the broker [177]. Providers violating this code will be banned from the ser-
vice repository and not be able to further advertise their services through
the broker. Legally proving a code violation is supposedly difficult, but
the framework could enforce the pressure on malicious service providers
by keeping log-files of transaction data, by collecting and managing abuse
complaints and by operating complaint-dedicated communication channels
between clients and service providers.
This countermeasure can be extended further by the integration of P3P
trust management within identity management. Service providers specify
their machine-readable P3P privacy policy as stated to the broker. Mobile
identity managers of users know user privacy preferences and retrieve the
relevant P3P policy before the users communicate with the providers. They
compare the policy and the preferences and warn the users in case any
conflict exists. The details of P3P-integration are explained in Section 5.3.5
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in detail.
3.2.3 Location-based Spamming
Spams are unsolicited messages, mostly in the form of commercial advertise-
ments. Meanwhile, the productivity of many companies is more and more
affected by the increasing number of spam e-mails since employees need
to spend a considerable amount of time separating wanted messages from
unwanted advertisements.
Although many Internet users feel annoyed by spam e-mails, graphical
user interfaces on modern PCs are able to give an easy overview of the e-mail
inbox, and deleting a single message usually only takes a mouse click.
In a mobile environment, however, small display sizes force the user’s
attention onto each message, and the restricted user interface requires more
user interaction during browsing and deleting. Since mobile phones and
handhelds are trusted devices for many people, receiving unwanted messages
on these devices is perceived as a massive privacy violation [177, 109].
In order to prevent anonymous spamming from unauthenticated sources,
sender authentication can be established. It is the case that even authenti-
cated service providers that are legal members of the service repository could
betray the user’s trust, send unwanted messages along with requested ser-
vices and abuse personal data in order to perform personalized and location-
based spamming. A shoe store could for example send advertisements to its
customers when they pass by the shop.
One way to prevent this type of spamming would be to allow only pull-
services, i.e. any communication between clients and service providers has
to be initiated by the client. However, many presumably valuable push
services exist, such as location-based notes or mobile dating services, which
would be excluded from the framework by this approach.
In addition to the methods discussed in the previous subsection, the
broker should rather support black or white listing of particular service
providers. Clients can submit black lists and white lists to the broker, which
then executes the lists on the user’s behalf by never recommending services
providers on the user’s black list and assuming those on the white list to be
trusted.
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3.2.4 Integrity and Authenticity of Service Descriptions and
Results
Integrity protects against unauthorized modification of information [165].
The integrity of the service descriptions stored and transmitted by the broker
are obviously very critical for users and service providers because they affect
choices of users when they decide on a service to request. Service descriptions
from an authentic broker that are modified by adversaries or come from
a spurious broker embarrass users and endanger the businesses of service
providers. Adversaries are especially interested in modifying information
about price, location and quality in descriptions.
To forge service descriptions, attackers can use a number of different
methods. They can alter the service descriptions of the authentic broker.
This modification can be done when service descriptions are either on the
communication channel or in the repository of the broker. Another method
is that a spurious broker pretends to be an authentic broker and sends
forged service descriptions to mobile users. Thus, the authenticity rating of
messages can also be forged. Modified service descriptions can result in many
serious effects. Users can be charged more money than the required cost or
pressurized to accept a bad service, for example. Even worse, users can be
directed to a faked service provider whose aim is only profiling their personal
data and stealing their credit card numbers. Like forged service descriptions,
service results which are sent by service providers to mobile clients as replies
to service requests can be forged on communication channels.
Digital signatures can be applied as cryptographic methods for both
integrity and authenticity which require checking for unauthorized modifi-
cation of messages and verification of the origins of service descriptions and
results, respectively. To enforce a digital signature scheme, the broker and
service providers should hold a public and private key pair. The broker
should sign its service descriptions with its private key and then distribute
them. Service providers should apply the same method for their service
results. Users should check the integrity of service descriptions and results
with the public key of the broker and service providers, respectively. Digital
signature solutions usually require a certificate management system to exist
in the framework.
The limited memory and CPU power of mobile devices are, however, big
challenges when verifying message signatures. The verification algorithm
running on mobile devices should therefore be well optimized.
In addition to the protection of unauthorized modification of messages
on the channel, data stored in the repository of a broker should obviously be
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authentic. Service providers as possible adversaries can aim to surpass that
of their competitor service providers by modifying the repository in such a
way that their service descriptions become more appealing to users.
The solution to the need for repository integrity is the enforcing of au-
thentication, authorization and intrusion detection mechanisms. Authenti-
cation enables only authenticated principals to access the repository. Au-
thorization provides that authenticated principals can work only with the
data that they are allowed to access. Intrusion detection tools like Trip-
wire [72] can check and audit modifications in the repository and notify
administrators of altered data.
3.2.5 Authentication and Authorization
After the registration process, service providers can apply to the broker
to update their service descriptions. To prevent unsanctioned modification
of the repository, the broker should authenticate and authorize the service
providers. Authenticated service providers are then allowed to modify only
entries that they own. Service providers can also require authenticating
genuine brokers as opposed to spurious brokers and therefore bi-directional
authentication is enforced.
Users will want to authenticate service providers in order to protect
their personal data from malicious adversaries that pretend to be service
providers. Conversely, many service providers need to authenticate their
clients, e.g. for accounting purposes.
Authentication can be enforced by three different methods: something
you know (e.g. passwords), something you have (e.g. smart cards) or some-
thing you are (e.g. fingerprints). Since all three methods by themselves
would provide only weak authentication, a combination of two methods
(two-factor authentication) is commonly used. As an example, token-based
authentication requires a combination of the methods what you have and
what you know. In token-based systems, the user holds a tamper-proof card
that periodically generates a new random token. The same token stream is
also generated on the remote server. The server authenticates the user if
and only if the user is able to present the currently valid token and a PIN
[55].
Two-factor authentication is desirable from a security point of view, but
requires additional infrastructure and in many cases limits usability and
scalability of the system as the authenticated entity has to provide at least
two pieces of information in each authentication process. A quite natural
solution is therefore to combine two-factor authentication and single sign-
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on mechanisms [110] in order to ensure the usability of the system. With
single sign-on, the identity is initially proved to the single sign-on service,
and subsequent authentications are performed against the sign-on service
instead of the authenticated entity itself. Both for authenticating users and
service providers, a single sign-on service could be integrated into the broker.
Another important aspect regarding authentication is that anonymity
should not be eliminated by authentication if users wish to stay anonymous
while being authenticated. That means it should be possible for the user
to show his/her authenticity by proving a certain fact about him/herself,
e.g. being a legal subscriber to a service, without revealing the user’s iden-
tity to the service provider. Conventional techniques such as transmitting
passwords or biometric information or identifying the user’s smart card do
not protect his/her anonymity. Cryptographic techniques based on crypto-
graphic credentials and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [116] provide a
solution to this problem: The authenticator can verify that the user actu-
ally is a legal subscriber, but cannot learn anything else about the user’s
identity.
For authorization, many solutions such as access control lists, certificate-
based authorization (e.g. SPKI [58]) which binds access rights to public
keys, role-based authorization etc. exist. In order to keep the security
architecture open, the architecture should not be restricted to only a specific
set of solutions, rather all solutions required by different services should be
provided.
3.2.6 Confidentiality of the Communication
Communication messages transmitted among the framework principals con-
tain sensitive information such as personal data, credit card numbers, loca-
tion, queries of mobile users, registration data of providers, results from bro-
ker and service providers etc. Identity management enables users to control
the personal data transmitted, but the disclosure of these sensitive infor-
mation would not be difficult in mobile networks where data is transmitted
over air and easily received by any mobile device. To prevent the unau-
thorized disclosure of data in messages (confidentiality), encrypted message
which only the authorized parties are able to decrypt and read messages is
required.
Many telecommunication technologies provide encryption mechanisms
between sender and network bearer. As a result of not trusted infrastructure
providers, end-to-end security which enables confidential message transmis-
sion between the principals (users-broker, users-providers, broker-providers)
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should be enforced. For end-to-end security, an SSL (Secure Socket Layer)
[117] based protocol can be implemented. Authentication of broker and
service providers, on-the-fly generation of session keys and its wide deploy-
ment in the public domain are the main advantages of SSL. In the protocol,
messages are encrypted with a symmetric key, but public key encryption
is used for the session key exchange. Hence, SSL requires also a certificate
management system.
Communication protocols often require additional data to be associated
with encrypted payload messages, e.g. for routing purposes. This data
needs to be publicly readable and therefore must not be encrypted, but
its authenticity should be established in the same way as for the payload
message. In this context, authenticated-encryption with associated-data
(AEAD) schemes [164] could significantly speed up the communication com-
pared to conventional methods, especially on low-capability mobile devices.
Web Service Security (WS-Security) [49], a group of communications
protocols for applying security to web services, also provides secure con-
versations methods namely WS-SecureConversation [84]. Unlike SSL, WS-
SecureConversation supports end-to-end encryption. For example, if a mes-
sage needs to go through any number of intermediaries before reaching to
the final receiver and each intermediary needs to check the full or partial
content of the message, the sender can encrypt the message individually
for each intermediary. Even different parts of messages can be encrypted
for different intermediaries and authentication of multiple party identities
is also possible. These are quite useful features for context-aware applica-
tions in which different users and providers need to interact together during
a multi-party service delivery. Even though SSL requires a separate secu-
rity context for each communication party (i.e. point-to-point security), we
have integrated SSL within the M-Business security architecture. This is
because WS-Security libraries are not currently available for mobile device
platforms and need to process very complex and processor time-consuming
XML-based messages.
3.2.7 Confidentiality of Locally Stored Data
In the mobile domain, where thefts of devices are very common [78], confi-
dentiality is especially required for protecting data stored locally on mobile
devices. Local data is sensitive, because it contains private information such
as name, address, special interests and possibly even credit card numbers.
To prevent thieves and other unauthorized users from reading the data, the
mobile device needs to authenticate the user trying to access it. This can
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be done by two-factor authentication (see Section 3.2.5), e.g. by fingerprint
authentication in combination with a PIN. Even if thieves figure out the PIN
by brute-forcing, they will not able to circumvent fingerprint authentication,
and the device will consequently not allow access to the data.
However, in many cases, it is possible to get around the access control
of the operating system by simply removing memory cards from the device
and plugging them into another system. Therefore, sensitive data should
always be stored in encrypted form, preferably by password-based symmetric
encryption, in which passwords are used to generate keys for the encryption
and decryption operations.
Alternatively, public key encryption can be used. The mobile user en-
crypts his/her local data with his/her public key. The corresponding private
key is stored by a remote system and can only be retrieved after authenti-
cation by a password.
3.2.8 Secure Software Development
Security is a non-functional property of applications. During the design
phase of software developments, integration of security aspects is mostly
not taken into consideration and is postponed to the implementation stage.
Applications are implemented – and then it is considered how to secure the
application. However, this approach does not work, since security require-
ments can conflict with the architecture design. This is one of the common
mistakes during software development. Therefore, the need for stringent
security should come into play during the initial design phase.
Another dilemma of software development regarding non-functional prop-
erties is bad modularity due to crosscutting concerns (e.g. security, excep-
tion handling, logging, database transactions, etc.). Security concerns cross-
cut with other application modules and this causes decomposition problems
[201, 200, 195]. For better management of security during software devel-
opment and execution phases, separation of business and security logics is
required [198, 199, 182].
Managing security at the design phase and separating business and se-
curity logics are good approaches for enhanced security. However, imple-
menting applications with bugs is another risk. Considering bugs that are
related to security modules, the risks are higher and more dangerous. A
small security bug may cause failure of the business itself. Mostly, designs
and implementations might be correct but their implementations contain
bugs due to human factors. If generation of source code from specifications
can be realized automatically, the risks from buggy implementations can be
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minimized (see Chapter 6).
Software bugs in mobile clients, broker and service provider applications
should be consequently non-existent. Hence, security components should
be designed and integrated into the software during the application design
phase. Separation of security from business logic is provided as far as possi-
ble and also automatic generation of final source code according to security
protocol specifications are also provided for the M-Business framework.
3.2.9 Usability vs. Security
It is a widely known fact that users, when faced with trading-off usability
and security, mostly prefer usability. As an example, consider password-
based authentication of service subscribers. To ensure the security of the
authentication, passwords must not be easily guessable, i.e. they should
not be chosen from dictionaries nor should they be names or birth dates.
Instead, passwords should contain capital letters, numbers and even non-
ASCII characters. Strong passwords increase security but they are not easy
to keep in mind and thus decrease usability. In spite of feeling uncomfortable
about it, many people nevertheless use weak passwords.
Another trade-off example is digital certificates. When the lifetime of
a certificate is over, it no longer guarantees the authenticity and validity
of its content. When a mobile device receives an invalid certificate from a
service provider or the broker, it should warn the user in a suitable manner.
Users, however, have different sensitivity regarding security. While invalid
certificate warnings are annoying and therefore decrease usability for some
users, others may find such warnings inevitable and desirable.
As both examples show, the M-Business framework should allow users
to balance usability and security according to their personal needs and not
enforce fixed security policies.
A dynamically configurable policy-based security management system is
a possible solution. Such a security management system can consist of the
following components and mechanisms:
• Password Manager : A password manager creates strong passwords for
different services, and encrypts and stores them on the local storage
medium. Users then do not need to worry about remembering all
strong passwords or using weak passwords. They only have to keep in
mind a master password for authentication by the password manager
and to retrieve passwords at any time.
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• Single-Sign-On (SS0) Mechanism: With the help of SSO, not all ser-
vice providers need to authenticate a particular user. Instead, a cen-
tral authentication server performs this task on behalf of the service
providers.
• Security Level Manager : The security level manager presents different
security levels (e.g. high, medium, low), and each level is bound to a
set of security options. Users can easily and dynamically switch from
one security level to another and also enable or disable any option
individually for each level.
• Identity Manager : An identity manager, as explained in Section 5.3,
provides full control over the disclosure of personal data in each trans-
action and therefore increases usability as well as security. Since loca-
tion information is generally considered to be very sensitive, the client
could trade-off security and quality of the returned service by adjust-
ing the accuracy of the location information that is transmitted to the
service provider, e.g. instead of transmitting exact GPS-coordinates,
the mobile client could send only the district or even only the city that
he/she is currently located in.
3.2.10 Secure Mobile Payment and Fair Exchange
Mobile payments involve transactions in which monetary values are trans-
ferred from mobile clients to service providers in order to pay for services
offered. Suitable monetary values for mobile payments are digital coins,
which can be stored on either the mobile device itself or smart card devices
(e.g. German Geldkarte). Alternatively, monetary values stored with a re-
mote trusted party (e.g. a credit card or an account in a bank) can be also
used for payments.
Credit card numbers and other payment media can be stolen during
message transmissions of payment protocol and misused by criminals. Mis-
use can be a serious matter for both users and service providers. It gives
difficulties users, because their credit cards were used on their behalf. It
also is detrimental to service providers, because in the case the users claim
that they were charged due to misuse of their credit cards, the money can
possibly be refunded by the providers. Hence, the mobile payment protocol
(or protocols) that would be deployed in the M-Business framework should
consider strong encryption methods to provide confidentiality of monetary
values transmitted over unreliable networks.
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Mobile users expect service providers to play fair when they exchange
service and monetary values. Otherwise, they may complain about an unfair
exchange and argue that:
• They were charged more money than the expected value.
• They were charged more than once.
• They were charged even though they did not get a service.
• They were charged even though they got a wrong service.
• They were charged even though they did not request any service.
• They were charged even though they are unhappy with the quality of
the received service.
Similarly, service providers also expect mobile users to play fair when
they exchange services and monetary values. Service providers can also
have different arguments to claim against users, e.g., that they are not paid
although they presented a service, they are not paid in time, or they are
paid less than the agreed amount.
In payment schemes, if any dispute comes up between client and mer-
chant, they need a trusted third party to solve the dispute. In the M-
Business framework, the broker can take the role of such a trusted party.
In order to provide evidence in cases of dispute, the payment protocols
should be able to account for all transactions of both parties. They should
also provide anonymous payment for certain applications, accountability
(non-repudiation), for users and service providers as well as mechanisms
verifying the authenticity and integrity of protocol messages.
3.2.11 Rogue Access Points and forged GPS-signals
Access points that are illegally attached to WLAN networks are called rogue
access points. If a rogue access point is attached to the M-Business frame-
work, mobile devices may fail as regards location determination, or sensitive
user data would be transmitted over rogue access points, which is dangerous
in terms of protection of privacy.
To prevent illegal attachments of access points, infrastructure providers
should make regular checks in order to detect rogue access points. Common
detection techniques are based on only wireless (e.g. sniffers for packet
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analyzing, enterprise-wide scan from a central location), only wired (e.g.
MAC address filtering) and hybrid approaches [98].
As well as access points, GPS-satellites can be fraudulently simulated
by ground stations transmitting GPS-signals in order to falsify the location
determination of clients. Since authentication of civilian GPS-messages is
not yet available [202] and will only be included in next-generation location
determination systems like GPS III and Galileo [152], particularly critical
applications should not trust the location information provided by GPS.
3.3 Extra Limitations
Since security issues directly affect the user-acceptance of M-Business ap-
plications, they are among the most important challenges for M-Business
framework. However, for several reasons, providing security is very prob-
lematic and difficult:
• Security is a difficult challenge in general: Providing security is an
engineering task. A “normal” engineer specifies the challenges and
provides solutions. A security engineer, however, tries to win a game
against a dynamically evolving malicious adversary. While the chal-
lenges that a normal engineer faces usually do not change unexpect-
edly, this is a quite normal and common situation for a security engi-
neer.
• There exists a trade-off between functionality and security: System
designers always face a trade-off between functionality and security.
Since security is a non-functional aspect of a system and end users
often intuitively prefer increased functionality over enhanced security,
this leads to overlooked security challenges.
• There are additional security challenges for mobile systems: Limited
capabilities of mobile devices prevent the deployment of common se-
curity solutions in the mobile domain. As an example, signing doc-
uments with digital signatures in order to ensure integrity in many
cases requires much CPU power, and not all mobile devices are ca-
pable of completing this task. Similarly, limited I/O functionality
prevents long passphrases and other advanced security-related user
interaction. Another challenge comes from wireless communication.
It is obviously much easier to eavesdrop data that is transmitted over
the air than to intercept wired communication channels. Also, it is
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much more difficult to detect a wireless eavesdropper than to detect
that someone has hooked into a wired connection. In addition, the
mobile communication environment changes steadily and there is no
implicit authentication by “being connected to the cable”.
• Support for security in standards is marginal and often broken: Typ-
ically, standards for wireless and mobile communication only provide
support for basic security features, such as confidential and authen-
tic communication between a mobile device and the next base station
or access point. Advanced security features thus have to be imple-
mented at the application level. However, even those basic security
features actually supported by standards often are broken by design.
A well-known example is “Wired Equivalent Privacy” (WEP) from
the IEEE 802.11 standard [197]. (The worst flaws of WEP are fixed
now by “WiFi Protected Access” (WPA) and by IEEE 802.11i, finally
approved in July, 2004.) Other old and well-known examples are due
to the GSM mobile standard: The one-sided authentication protocol
(only the mobile device authenticates itself to the base station, but
the base station does not authenticate itself to the mobile device), and
the insecurity of the GSM A5 stream cipher [204].
• A new privacy challenge is how to control location information: This
challenge stems from unauthorized disclosure of location information.
The owner of a device should be able to explicitly control the transmis-
sion of his/her location. If the location becomes available to malicious
adversaries, privacy issues — possibly as severe as danger to life and
limb — may arise.
Chapter 4
Exploits against User
Privacy
4.1 Privacy Challenges
In 1999, the chief executive officer of Sun Microsystems Scott McNealy said
that “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.” [179]. Today in the
Internet era, privacy has become a more critical issue. As summarized very
well in Figure 4.1, much personal data are shared over many different appli-
cations. Being concerned with emails, online banking, e-government appli-
cations, online groups and communities, e-commerce, social networks, blogs,
etc., protecting privacy has become nearly impossible. Nevertheless, we will
take into consideration all social, legal and technical aspects of privacy and
propose solutions to help individuals to safeguard their privacy against the
personal data threats.
Privacy risks go beyond the mere collecting of some personal data. Vio-
lations can even threaten the lives of people in certain circumstances. Peo-
ple might not be aware of the importance of their privacy unless they are
threatened by exploitation of their personal data. People would become
more sensitive in terms of their privacy if they are informed about the real-
life abuses of privacy and its (often serious) consequences. If an attacker
(i.e. a person or a service provider) retrieves your personal data and mis-
uses it for malicious purposes such as profiling, spamming or selling to third
parties, you would be more conscious about the need for the protection of
your privacy.
In context-aware applications, service providers and other principals have
also great opportunity if they want to threaten user privacy [142]. In this
CHAPTER 4. EXPLOITS AGAINST USER PRIVACY 42
section, some examples of a number of privacy violations against mobile
users in the Friend Finder application are given. The possible attackers are
other users, the location provider or other third party providers.
Figure 4.1: Fragments of Identity1
4.1.1 Location- and Action-relevant Risks
Considering a “Big Brother”-like life, most people would not prefer that
others know exactly what they are doing and where they are going during
a day.
This risk exists in the Friend Finder application. With the aim of track-
ing users and revealing their actions and activities, attackers can collect and
analyze location data of users. They can even target a single user and store
his/her location information at different times at different places. They can
1Referenced from http://www.identityblog.com/?p=893
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even find out where the mobile user was (e.g. if he/she was in a night club
or fitness center), follow his/her actions or even guess the places at which
he/she would be in the future.
Additionally, not only the providers but also other mobile users may want
to reveal the location of a particular user without having any permission.
As an example, your boss can threaten your privacy by trying to find out
where you go and what you do in the evenings. This information is private
to you and should also remain confidential.
4.1.2 Relationship-relevant Risks
As a member of the society, people can build contacts with many people (i.e.
friend, relatives, family, etc.). That means each person has his or her own
social network which is private to himself or herself. People do not need or
want necessarily to release their contact lists to others. The existing social
networks (e.g. Facebook [17], Xing [76]) support enabling or disabling of
contact list release to others as a privacy preference.
This privacy risk exists also in the Friend Finder application. With the
aim of revealing the relations among mobile users, attackers collect location
information and try to find out who stay in the same place or travel towards
the same direction at the same time. This would give hints about the rela-
tionships among certain users. Additionally, the friend-search queries can be
collected and analyzed in order to reveal communications and relationships
between different people.
4.1.3 Monetary Risks
In actual, physical life, many people prefer hiding certain personal features
like wealth, i.e. having something that is very costly. Mobile devices which
contain advanced functions and thus are very expensive would seem to be
ideal candidates for thieves to steal. Therefore, certain aspects of mobile
devices are private and should be kept private. In the Friend Finder appli-
cation, the risks exist that the private aspects of mobile devices and users
themselves can be retrieved by potential and actual attackers.
The User Agent Profile (UAProf) [73] is a specification for capturing
capability and preference information for wireless devices. Content providers
can benefit from this information by creating content in an appropriate
format for the specific device [69]. Device capabilities (i.e. device model) can
make it clear, for example, whether it is a cheap or costly device [148, 111].
Retrieval UAProf data by attackers can result into risk from two different
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perspectives. Firstly, thieves can locate costly devices and target their own-
ers to steal their devices. Secondly, the location provider can collect UAProf
data sent by mobile users and profile them according to their mobile device
types. The profiles can be shared with third-party mobile device companies
to send unsolicited advertisements to mobile users. This spamming problem
would threaten the privacy of mobile users.
4.1.4 Medical Data Risks
Privacy of medical data is most desirable for nearly all people. Revealing
that what illnesses or handicaps you have is not something you would prefer.
A concrete example has been experienced in Germany in August 2008 (see
Section 4.3). The German health insurance organization DAK forwarded
sensitive health data of over 200.000 members illegally to a private US-
company (namely Healthways) without getting the consent of these members
[12]. As a result, Krankenkasse members/contributors have become very
anxious about their privacy.
However, UAProf specifications contain preference information of wire-
less devices, too. User preferences (e.g. font size) can give hints about
users’ visual acuity. People with weak visual acuity prefer big font sizes and
displays with image-disabled functionality, for example.
4.1.5 Dynamic Pricing
The price of a service with a certain quality is expected to be a fixed value.
In contrast service providers may require different payment amounts for
the same service based on the wealth of a person or their nationality. For
example, a payment policy such as “the price is 10 Euros higher for people
from European countries” or another policy “rich people pay more” can
easily be applied. This is called dynamic pricing.
Dynamic pricing is also another monetary risk in the Friend Finder. The
location provider can analyze how frequently mobile users retrieve the service
and make profiles of users based on their purchasing activities. Afterwards,
they can apply dynamic pricing. In addition, UAProf profiles the owners
of costly devices can also help attackers/commercial enterprises to apply
dynamic pricing. These privacy risks ought to be avoided in the Friend
Finder application.
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4.2 Legal Directives
Considering privacy as a human right from the legal perspectives, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council of the European Union have published the
directive 95/46/EC [16] and the directive 2002/58/EC [15] as a continuation
of the directive 95/46/EC.
Considering the legal aspects, the privacy and security threats should be
carefully taken into consideration when technical systems are designed and
implemented. This requires service providers and the broker to take heed of
privacy and security risks and system developers to develop and integrate
PET (privacy enhancing technologies) tools within software architectures in
order to support mobile users.
4.2.1 The Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection)
The directive 95/46/EC (in full title “Directive 95/46/EC on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data”) published in 1995 focuses on data protection.
The object of the directive is defined in Article 1:
“In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular
their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”
The definition of personal data is given in Article 2-a:
“personal data shall mean any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (data subject); an identifiable person
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors spe-
cific to his/her physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity”
Article 7-a requires that personal data of a data subject can be only
processed if he or she has given his/her consent:
“Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed
only if:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent, or”
CHAPTER 4. EXPLOITS AGAINST USER PRIVACY 46
Privacy of personal data is guaranteed in Article 8-a, but 8-b and 8-c
detail some exceptions:
“Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data re-
vealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philo-
sophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data
concerning health or sex life.”
The rules of data collection are explained in Article 10:
“Member States shall provide that the controller or his representa-
tive must provide a data subject from whom data relating to himself
are collected with at least the following information, except where he
already has it:
(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended;
(c) any further information (such as the recipients of the data,
whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, the
existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data
concerning him)”
In this directive, it should be understood that brokers and service providers
must obey the rules in order to help individuals to guarantee their personal
data privacy.
4.2.2 The Directive 2002/58/EC (E-Privacy)
This directive is a complement to the EU Directive 95/46/EC. It is con-
cerned with the processing of personal data and protection of privacy in the
electronic communication sector.
Relevant to context-aware and location-aware applications, it addresses
issues such as security, confidentiality, data storage and location data.
According to Article 4 (Security); service providers must take appro-
priate measures to safeguard the security of their services. If a security
risk exists, their users should be informed of this risk and any likely costs
involved with providing the possible remedies.
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According to Article 5 and 6 (Confidentiality); member states shall
ensure the confidentiality of communications and the related traffic data
through national legislation. They shall ensure also that access to and pro-
cessing of the data is allowed only if the user concerned is clearly informed
and gives his consent.
According to Article 6 (Data Storage); user data can be stored and
processed by service providers only for the duration necessary for the ser-
vices and billing purpose. Service providers should always keep subscribers
informed of the types of data they are processing and the purposes and du-
ration for which this is done. The data stored must be also erased or made
anonymous when it is no longer needed for the purpose of the transmission.
In addition, the users should be always in the position of withdrawing their
consents to store and process their data.
According to Article 7 (Itemized Bills); itemized bills improve possibil-
ities for the subscribers to check the accuracy of the fees charged by the
service providers but at the same time it may jeopardize the privacy of the
users of publicly available electronic communications services. Therefore,
subscribers should have the option of receiving non-itemized bills or privacy
enhancing methods of communication and payments.
According to Article 2 and 9 (Location Data); location data means any
data processed in an electronic communications network, indicating the ge-
ographic position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available
electronic communications service. Service providers must inform their users
or subscribers, prior to obtaining their consent, of the type of location data
other than traffic data which will be processed, of the purposes and duration
of the processing and whether the data will be transmitted to a third party
for the purpose of providing a value added service. Users or subscribers
shall be given the possibility to withdraw their consent for the processing of
location data other than traffic data at any time.
In this directive, privacy of location data is explicitly protected. Bro-
kers and service providers collecting location data of users must consider
these legacy rules, define their privacy policies accordingly and enforce their
privacy practices as stated in the EU directives.
4.3 Privacy Threats in the Media
Much news is published in the media about threats to privacy. People are
theoretically at risk by using online banking, publishing private information
in blogs or social networking sides, etc. In this section, some concrete exam-
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ples are given to show that privacy can be a headache in cases where privacy
is not seriously considered and the required measures/countermeasures are
not taken.
In early 2000s, Ellen Simonetti became a victim of a privacy issue [176,
192]. She was a flight attendant for Delta Air Lines for 8 years, but was
dismissed from her job since she had published her “inappropriate” pictures
in Delta uniform on her personal web blog [8].
Identity theft in online banking is also a very critical issue in terms
of privacy. Applying phishing attacks, attackers steal and misuse identities
(e.g. passwords, bank account data, PIN numbers, TAN numbers) of victims
and execute e-banking transactions on behalf of the victims. Many real life
identity theft events have occurred [11] and the victims have been left in
desperate situations.
A serious privacy violation happened in August 2008 in Germany, as
mentioned in the previous section. It was realized that the German health
insurance provider (Krankenkasse) DAK had forwarded sensitive health data
of over 200.000 patients illegally to a private US-company (namely Health-
ways) without getting the consent of their members [12]. The DAK has
been criticized very extensively for causing this privacy violation and their
members (i.e. the victims) have become very anxious about their privacy.
Some shopping companies started tracking customers by listening on the
whisperings of their mobile phones [149]. They can tell when people enter
a shopping center, what stores they visit, how long they remain there, and
what route they took as they walked around.
Mobile phones can be further used to track anyone thanks to a service
called World Tracker which lets you use data from cell phone towers and
GPS systems to pinpoint anyone’s exact whereabouts, any time as long as
they have their phone on them. The service shows you the exact location of
the phone by the minute, conveniently pinpointed on a Google Map [162].
The anonymity network Tor has been also targeted for stealing user-
names and passwords [52]. The exit nodes can access unencrypted data if
no end-to-end encryption (i.e. SSL, TLS, HTTPS) is enforced between the
sender and the receiver. The hacker Dan Egerstad equipped with 5 exit
nodes in the Tor network and sniffed 100 log-in credentials of mainly em-
bassies and consulates in different countries. He publicized the list of the
credentials, but then was arrested by the Swedish police [172].
Attackers can find their victims today with Google search engine (see
Section 4.4). This is called as Google hacking and much news has already
appeared in the media regarding the risks of Google hacking [139]. The fol-
lowing examples show the revealing of private information by using Google.
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Figure 4.2: A private Chat Log
In Figure 4.2, the private chat logs between an Italian man (age 35) and a
younger girl can be followed. In Figure 4.3, passwords are revealed from a
dumped database. In Figure 4.4, the private inbox and sent emails of an
online journal are listed. In Figure 4.5, many confidential documents are
listed by Google.
Another critical tool in terms of privacy of Google is Google Calendar.
Attackers can use it for searching for private personal data (e.g. appoint-
ments, credit card numbers). Even sensitive business data can be made
public on the Google calendar [140]. As concrete examples, McKinsey dial-
in information was posted by an employee who had shared some calendar
events including project status meetings and call-in numbers for a company
project. This was also confirmed by the spokesman of the company. In
addition, the details for several JPMorgan Chase & Co. conference calls
relating to the company’s storage systems, including a dial-in number and
passcode for a telephone call could be seen publicly.
Google Earth can be also used for privacy threats. For example, UK-
Teens have used Google Earth images to find houses with swimming pools.
CHAPTER 4. EXPLOITS AGAINST USER PRIVACY 50
Figure 4.3: Dumped Passwords
Once they find a target, they use Facebook to arrange an organized, but
uninvited pool-crash [175].
All these real-life privacy exploits in this section should have shown that
privacy can be threatened any time, anywhere, even by people or organiza-
tions with which you are not familiar. It is therefore highly desirable that
individuals should be aware of possible threats, take the required counter-
measures and consequently protect themselves.
4.4 A Case Study: Google Hacking
This subsection focuses on a case study for privacy exploits, i.e. Google
Hacking and some real life attacks against user privacy are presented. The
exploits are not applied directly in context-aware applications, but they
make it clear that if users do not take into consideration the necessity of
protecting themselves against possible violations of their privacy, they most
probably would fail to enable a secure and private digital life for themselves
in any kind of application.
The exploitations of privacy violations are based on web search engines
which are the biggest service providers (e.g. Google, Yahoo, Lycos, etc.)
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Figure 4.4: Private Emails
for information searches in the Internet. However, they threaten personal
privacy by indexing more and more secret and private data for unauthorized
access. The biggest threats can result from their “indexing anything” fea-
tures. In particular, Google is the most popular web search engine on the
Internet. It indexes vast amounts of information from web servers thanks
to its hardworking web crawlers. As a result, sensitive personal data that
should be kept secret and confidential are indexed by Google, too. Personal
data like name, address, phone numbers, emails, CVs, chat logs, forum and
mailing list postings, username-password pairs for login sites, private di-
rectories, documents, images, online devices like web cameras without any
access control, secret keys, private keys, encrypted messages, etc. are all
available to others via Google. This is called Google Hacking and threatens
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Figure 4.5: Confidential Documents
our privacy. In addition to the privacy risks, there might exist other secu-
rity threats that can be revealed by Google. There is an online database
[25], which contains 1423 different Google hacking search queries in differ-
ent categories (e.g. files containing juicy info, pages containing login portals,
various online devices, vulnerable servers, etc.) as at November 2008.
In addition, attackers can use automatic tools to execute attacks on
privacy and reveal sensitive, confidential and secret personal data. User-
centric countermeasures should be applied by individual users to safeguard
against Google Hacking.
4.4.1 Google Search Parameters
In addition to the basic search operators (i.e. +,-,.), Google supports other
parameters (i.e. intitle, inurl, intext, filetype, site, etc.) for advanced
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searches and filters its results according to these parameters provided by
users.
“ + ”,“ - ”,“ * ”, “ | ” and quotation (" ") are the basic search operators.
To retrieve particular pages containing some certain keywords, the plus (+)
operator can be used to combine the keywords. The minus (-) operator is
placed just before a keyword and pages containing this keyword are removed
from the result list. It can be put also in front of an advanced operator and
reverses its behavior. As an example, a search query containing the parame-
ter -site:www.example.com will not list the results from www.example.com.
The star (*) operator is used as a wildcard operator. The operator "|" or
the keyword "OR" can be used for combining different search queries with
a logical OR. Keywords put within quotations (" ") are searched for as a
phrase.
Advanced operators related to Google hacking are inurl, intitle, intext,
site, filetype and ext [23, 134]. [all]inurl parameter is used to filter out
the results according to a certain keyword contained in url. If more than
one keyword is needed for filtering, the allinurl parameter should be used.
[all]intitle filters the results according to titles of web pages. [all]intext
searches the keywords in the body of web pages. With the parameter site
you can apply host-specific searches. filetype and ext parameters have the
same functionality and are needed to filter out the results based on file
extensions (e.g. html, php, pdf, doc, etc.).
A concrete example can help to understand these parameters. For ex-
ample, you are interested in finding security-relevant pdf documents in Ger-
many. The query (intitle="security" ext:pdf site:de) can precisely
define your search and return better results from Google.
4.4.2 Exploits against Personal Data
Google can be queried for revealing sensitive personal data by using its
advanced search parameters [186, 187]. An attacker can target a certain
person and benefit from automated tools exploiting the person’s privacy.
The private data searches are grouped into four different groups ac-
cording to the privacy level. These are identification data, sensitive data,
confidential data and secret data searches.
Identification Data
The identification data is related to personal identity of users. Name, sur-
name, address, phone number, marital status, CV, alias, nickname used over
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the Internet, etc. are the typical examples of the identification data. Some
private data searches focus on a certain person and the most common name
“Thomas Fischer” in Germany is chosen as the test candidate2.
Name, Address, Phone, etc.
You can search for web pages and documents which contain keywords
like name, surname, address, phone numbers, birthday, email, etc., option-
ally for a certain person or within certain document types.
allintext:name email phone address intext:"thomas fischer" ext:pdf
TWiki3 is a wiki-based web application that is commonly used for project
management. Inside TWiki, user data like name, address, phone numbers,
web pages, location, emails, etc. are stored. If the required authentication
techniques are not enforced, unauthorized people can also access this data.
intitle:Twiki inurl:view/Main "thomas fischer"
In addition to Google search, other search engines with the “people-
find” capability can also be very helpful for obtaining identification data.
Yahoo’s People Search4, Lycos’s WhoWhere People Search5 or eMailman’s
People Search6 connecting public ldap servers are examples of such services.
Similarly, the Firefox plug-in “People Search and Public Record Toolbar”7
gives you many facilities to search for the identification data.
Curriculum Vitae
You can search for the keyword CV (curriculum vitae) that return docu-
ments containing identification data. This search can be extended by search-
ing for “CV” in different languages. For example, Lebenslauf can be used
within the search query as the German translation for CV.
2We have come to this conclusion by comparing different combinations via
www.googlefight.com
3TWiki: http://twiki.org
4Yahoo People Search: http://people.yahoo.com
5Lycos People Search: http://peoplesearch.lycos.com
6eMailman People Search: http://www.emailman.com/ldap/public.html
7People Search and Public Record Toolbar, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-
US/firefox/addon/3167
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intitle:CV OR intitle:Lebenslauf "thomas fischer"
intitle:CV OR intitle:Lebenslauf ext:pdf OR ext:doc
Login Names
The Webalizer application8 collects statistical information over web sites
about their visitor activities. The most commonly used login names are also
stored by Webalizer.
intitle:"Usage Statistics for" intext:"Total Unique Usernames"
Sensitive Data
With sensitive data, it is meant that data which is normally public but its
revelation may disturb its owner in certain situations. Examples are post-
ings sent to forums, emails sent to mailing lists, sensitive directories and
Web2.0-based social networking applications.
Forum Postings, Mailinglists
PhpBB9 is a widespread web forum application. It enables the collecting
of all postings sent by a particular user. The following search finds out all
postings sent with the alias thomas to different phpBB-based forums.
inurl:"search.php?search author=thomas"
Mailman10 is a well-known mailing list manager. The following search
gives all email postings which are sent to mailman-based lists and related
to Thomas Fischer.
inurl:pipermail "thomas fischer"
Sensitive Directories
Backup directories can contain sensitive data about users, organizations,
companies, etc.
8Webalizer: http://www.mrunix.net/webalizer/
9PhpBB Forum: http://www.phpbb.com
10Mailman List Manager: http://www.gnu.org/software/mailman/
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intitle:"index of" inurl:/backup
Web2.0 Applications
The next generation Web2.0 applications introduce more privacy risks.
People share more personal data with others within Web2.0-based social
networking and blogging applications. The following searches are based on
the favorite Web2.0 services like Yahoo’s Image Sharing11, Google’s Blog-
ger12, Google’s Video Sharing13 and Facebook Social Networking14. Instead
of searching through Google, searching directly on the original sites would
give more efficient results.
"Thomas Fischer" site:blogspot.com
"thomas" site:flickr.com OR site:youtube.com
"thomas fischer" site:facebook.com
Confidential Data
The confidential data is normally expected to be non-public for others ex-
cept for a group of certain people, but Google makes it possible to access
such private data as well.
Chat Logs
You can search for chat log files related to a certain nickname.
"session start" "session ident" thomas ext:txt
Username and Password
Username-password pairs can be searched within sql dump files and other
documents.
"create table" "insert into" "pass|passwd|password" (ext:sql
| ext:dump | ext:dmp | ext:txt)
11Yahoo Image Sharing: http://www.flickr.com
12Google’s Blogger: http://www.blogspot.com
13Google Video Sharing: http://www.youtube.com
14Facebook-Social Networking: http://www.facebook.com
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"your password is *" (ext:csv | ext:doc | ext:txt)
Private Emails
Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express store personal emails in single
files such as incoming messages “inbox.dbx”. The following searches target
the email files stored by Outlook Express or Microsoft Outlook.
"index of" inbox.dbx
"To parent directory" inurl:"Identities"
Confidential Directories and Files
Confidential directories and files can be revealed with the following query.
"index of" (private | privat | secure | geheim | gizli)
In order to prevent web crawlers listing private directories, Robot Ex-
clusion Standard [54] is used.
inurl:"robots.txt" "User-agent" ext:txt
On the other hand, robots.txt files enumerate a number of private direc-
tory paths. As an example, the robots.txt file of the White House presents
hints about sensitive directories, as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
Not only directories but also private documents and images can be
searched for with Google.
"This document is private | confidential | secret" ext:doc |
ext:pdf | ext:xls
intitle:"index of" "jpg | png | bmp" inurl:personal | inurl:private
Online Webcams
Online web cameras come along with their software for remote manage-
ment over the Internet. Based on the types of webcams, you can filter the
url and the title as listed in [25] and access to the online webcam devices
without any access control. As an example;
intitle:"Live View / - AXIS" | inurl:view/view.shtml
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Figure 4.6: The robots.txt file of www.whitehouse.gov
Secret Data
Secret keys, private keys and encrypted messages comprise secret data,
which is expected to be accessible only to its owner. The invasions of privacy
regarding this group are explained in the following section in detail.
4.4.3 Attempts to obtain Cryptographic Secrets
Google can be also used to reveal cryptographic secrets by using its ad-
vanced search parameters [184]. Cryptographic secrets searches are grouped
into six different groups: hashed passwords, secret keys, public keys, private
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keys, encrypted messages and signed messages. Public keys are not secret
information but included in our queries for the sake of completeness.
Hashed Passwords
Database structures and contents can be backed up in dump files. The
following query searches for SQL clauses that may contain usernames and
passwords in clear text or in hashed values within dump files. Hash and
encryption relevant keywords can also be searched for within files.
" create table" "insert into" "pass|passwd|password" (ext:sql
| ext:dump | ext:dmp)
intext:" password|pass|passwd" intext:"md5|sha1|crypt" (ext:sql
| ext:dump | ext:dmp)
Secret Keys
Since secret keys are generated mostly as session keys and destroyed after
the session is closed, they are not stored on disks permanently. There are,
however, still some applications that need to store secret keys, e.g., Kerberos
[33] shares a secret key with each registered principal for authentication
purposes.
The following query lists the configuration files of a key distribution cen-
ter (KDC) in Kerberos. Within the configuration files, the path of principal
databases which contain principal ids and their secret keys is specified.
inurl:"kdc.conf" ext:conf
In order to find dumped Kerberos principal databases, the following
query can be used:
inurl:"slave datatrans" OR inurl:"from master"
Java provides a tool named keytool to create and manage secret keys
in key stores. The extension of such keystores is ks. The following query
searches for java key stores that may contain secret keys. Note that keytool
can also manage private keys and certificate chains.
keystore ext:ks
CHAPTER 4. EXPLOITS AGAINST USER PRIVACY 60
Public Keys
Public keys, as the name implies, are public information and not secret. For
the sake of completeness, the search queries that list public keys are also
detailed here.
To list PGP public key files:
" BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK" (ext:txt | ext:asc | ext:key)
To list public keys in certificate files:
" Certificate:Data:Version" "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" (ext:crt |
ext:asc | ext:txt)
Private Keys
Private keys should be kept secret for personal use but the following search
queries show that people do take insufficient care about this and frequently
make them publicly accessible.
" BEGIN (DSA|RSA)" ext:key
" BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK" inurl:txt|asc
Gnupg [63] encodes the private key in secring.gpg. The following search
reveals secring.gpg files:
" index of" "secring.gpg"
Encrypted Files
For confidentiality, cryptography provides encryption of data. By encrypt-
ing, one can store sensitive files and emails securely on local storage devices.
The following queries search for encrypted files and emails. It is certain
that you need to know the relevant keys for decryption but as shown in the
previous examples, it is also possible to find secret keys and private keys. In
addition, various cryptanalysis techniques can help to decrypt the encrypted
files [171].
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The files that are encrypted with Gnupg get the extension gpg for bi-
nary encoding and the extension asc for ASCII encoding. The following
first query searches files with gpg extension and tries to eliminate signed
and public key files from the results. The second query lists ASCII encoded
encrypted files. It is the case that signed files have also the same pattern
and can be returned with the second query:
-" public|pubring|pubkey|signature|pgp|and|or|release" ext:gpg
-" BEGIN PGP MESSAGE" ext:asc
Many encryption applications use the extension enc for the encrypted
files. There are some exceptions like AxCrypt File Encryption Software [6]
which uses the extension axx for encrypted files:
-intext:"and" (ext:enc | ext:axx)
In XML Security, the encrypted parts of messages are encoded under
CipherValue element:
"ciphervalue" ext:xml
Signed Messages
Digital signatures provide integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation in
cryptography. The following searches list some signed messages, signed
emails and file signatures.
To list pgp signed messages (emails excluded):
"BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE" -"From" (ext:txt | ext:asc | ext:xml)
To list signed emails:
"BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE" "From" "Date" "Subject" (ext:eml
| ext:txt | ext:asc)
To list file signatures:
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-"and|or" "BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE" ext:asc
4.4.4 Countermeasures
Google hacking can be very harmful against user privacy and therefore the
required security countermeasures should be taken. The protection methods
can be grouped as user-self protection and system-wide protection.
As its name implies, user-self protection requires users to safeguard them-
selves against the possible threats. Possible countermeasures are as follows:
• Do not make any sensitive data like documents containing your ad-
dress, phone numbers, backup directories and files, secret data like
passwords, private emails, etc. online accessible to public.
• Provide only the minimum required amount of personal information
for the Wiki-similar management systems.
• Instead of using a single username over the Internet, try to have more
pseudonyms which make linkability of user actions through a single
username more difficult.
• Considering forum postings and group mails, try to stay anonymous for
certain email contents. Do not mention any company or organization
name inside your postings if not required.
• Do not let private media be shared over social networking and blogging
services.
As an administrator, you should focus on system-wide protection for
the privacy of your users as well. The first method you can enforce is
using automatic scan tools [26, 79, 137, 133] that search possible Google
threats and test privacy risks within your system. The tools mostly use the
hack database [25] when they do the scans. Another method is integration
of robots.txt (robots exclusion standard) [54] files into your system. Web
crawlers (hopefully) respect the directives specified in robots.txt. If this
is provided, you can prevent the crawlers from indexing your sensitive files
and directories. In addition to this method, you should never make database
backups that contain usernames and passwords accessible to public over your
system. The most advanced but also complicated method is installing and
managing Google honeypots [82] in your system and trying to figure out the
behavior of attackers before they attack your real system.
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4.4.5 TrackingDog: A Penetration Testing Tool for Privacy
To help users to protect their privacy, new privacy enhancing tools are
needed. For example, users can be equipped with a penetration testing
tool that would search automatically for the possible privacy threats, report
its results and warn users. If this is provided, users can be aware of the
privacy risks that threaten them.
Figure 4.7: TrackingDog - Main GUI
Martin Keßler has implemented the tool namely TrackingDog [137] which
searches Google exploits mainly for personal data and cryptographic secrets
for a given person and/or a given host. TrackingDog helps individuals to
detect if any of their confidential data have become public over the Internet
via Google. It supports both English and German language-specific queries
and enables users to edit raw search queries.
Figure 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the main and result GUI of TrackingDog
respectively. In the main GUI, you can choose the queries from the category
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Figure 4.8: TrackingDog - Result GUI
tree and also choose the language for the search. Currently, only German
and English searches are supported. You can also enter certain personal
names and/or certain host names for your search.
In the result GUI, you get the web links which are found after the search
and categorized accordingly. You can click on any result url and open it in
a separate web browser.
4.4.6 Related Tools
In addition to TrackingDog, other tools exist which automate the process of
security checking via Google. The tools mostly use Johnny Long’s database
[25]. These database entries are also called as Googledorks.
Gooscan [133] is a Unix/Linux script written by Johnny Long. Based on
his database entries, the tool searches for certain key words within a given
search engine. For example, executing the following script
texttt$ gooscan -t www.google.de -q ”index.of picasa.ini” -s de -o output.txt,
the query ”index.of picasa.ini” is searched for within google.de (specified with
the parameter -t). The search is restricted with only web sites from German
domains (specified with the parameter -s) and the results are written into an
output.txt file. The main aim of this application is helping security experts
and administrators to check the security of their systems.
SiteDigger [79], a free application from FoundStone Inc. (a division of
CHAPTER 4. EXPLOITS AGAINST USER PRIVACY 65
McAfee), can search hacking queries for a given host. Unlike Gooscan, you
do not have to provide any search query. It can use the Googledork database
as well as its own database and search all queries in the database for the
given host. Additionally, it provides a helpful GUI for user interaction as
shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: SiteDigger - SiteDigger Google Hacking Scanner
Goolink [26] is a very similar tool to Gooscan and uses the Googledork
database. AdvancedDork [1] is not a Google hacking tool, but a firefox plug-
in which supports searching within Google by using the advanced search key
words.
4.4.7 Discussion
Considering the privacy exploits explained in the previous section, one can
ask oneself if such exploits are also misused by Google itself to profile people
and track their activities. Even though Google replies to this question with
a no and claims to respect our privacy, most people can not be sure about
this dilemma.
In contrast some good approaches to privacy by Google exist as well.
Recently, they have declared that they would take steps to further improve
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privacy. By searching in Google, your query, your IP and cookie details are
stored on the Google servers and that information can identify you uniquely.
However, Google has decided firstly to anonymize this collected data within
a 18-24 month period [60]. In November 2007, they re-established a new
privacy policy and decided to anonymize search logs after 18 months. On
the other hand, you can apply other means to remove your cookies from
Google servers as explained in [80].
We believe, Google can do more for our privacy. The privacy exploits
mentioned above could be taken into consideration by Google. Personal
data should not be collected by Google. Internet users are careless and
easily make their personal data public unintentionally. This should not be
misused by Google. While we hope to gain more respect for our privacy
from Google, we also need to help users to get equipped with powerful user-
centric privacy enhancing tools such as TrackingDog so as to get to know
the threats and to protect themselves.
It is very clear from Google hacking that service providers collecting
personal data can directly abuse the privacy of users or cause others to abuse
it indirectly by selling or forwarding data. The DAK privacy violation [12]
is a good example of privacy abuse. Similarly, service providers of context-
aware applications have also the possibility to threaten user privacy. The
individuals should also be aware of possible risks and try to prevent misuse
of their personal data.
Chapter 5
User-centric Proposed
Solutions
5.1 The SALSA Client Security Architecture
The SALSA client security architecture consists of three main security com-
ponents. As shown in Figure 5.1, these components are security manager,
anonymity manager and storage manager. There are also other relevant se-
curity components and they are extending the functionalities of these three
main components.
• Security Manager: This is the central component in the security ar-
chitecture. It controls the interactions among other components. It
accomplishes the following tasks within the architecture:
– Management of secure communication with the broker and service
providers
– Management of client authentication over the broker and service
providers, i.e. pseudonym and credential managements
– Management of identity, i.e. personal data such as location,
name, address, etc.
– Management of different security levels for applications (i.e. dy-
namic security)
• Anonymity Manager: This is the main component for supporting
anonymous communication based on Mix-nets. It interacts with other
components (e.g. Identity Manager) to accomplish its task.
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Figure 5.1: The SALSA Client Security Architecture
• Storage Manager: This component is responsible for storing confiden-
tial data (e.g. personal data, credentials, privacy preferences, policies,
etc.) in a secure way (i.e. encrypted) on mobile devices. When other
components need to save or restore confidential data, they interact
with the storage manager.
The extended security architecture is shown in Figure 5.2. The security
manager communicates with the anonymity manager, identity manager and
storage manager. The identity manager interacts with the storage manager
and the policy manager. The anonymity manager requires interacting with
the policy manager in order to retrieve the relevant anonymity policies and
enforce the required mechanisms to build anonymous channels. The crypto
manager is a complementary component for the storage manager. The secu-
rity library is accessible to all components in the security architecture. The
components of the extended architecture have the following responsibilities:
• Identity Manager: Mobile Identity Management enables mobile users
to control privacy of their personal data (see Section 5.3). The iden-
tity manager supports the functionality of personal data management.
Before personal data is sent to any other principal, the identity man-
ager takes this request and accepts or rejects this request based on
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user preferences and context. It can even blur the requested personal
data before releasing it. For example, instead of sending exact GPS
coordinates, the city name can be forwarded or similarly, salary infor-
mation can be sent in ranges. Mobile users can specify their privacy
preferences through the interaction with the policy manager.
• Policy Manager: This component is responsible for managing anonymity
policies and user privacy preferences. Both policies and preferences are
stored in encrypted form thanks to the storage manager.
• Crypto Manager: For the encryption or decryption of data, the stor-
age manager needs to obtain the support of the crypto manager which
implements certain cryptographic operations based on the security li-
brary on the platform.
• Security Library: The security library contains different methods for
cryptographic operations (i.e. encryption, hash, SSL-based communi-
cation, digital signature creation and verification, etc.). In addition to
pure Java security APIs, cryptlib [10] security APIs which run faster
than Java security APIs on mobile devices have been additionally in-
tegrated within the security library of the SALSA client security ar-
chitecture.
Communicating over untrusted networks (i.e. the Internet), it is a neces-
sity to communicate over secure channels. In order to build secure channels
for the communications of mobile users-the broker and mobile users-service
providers, SSL-based communications has been implemented as seen in Fig-
ure 5.3. The security manager on mobile devices is responsible for creating
the secure channels and executing the relevant cryptographic operations. It
is not possible to integrate standard SSL Java APIs from the provider Sun
onto mobile devices. Hence, Bouncy Castle lightweight Crypto APIs [100]
has been used for the implementation.
5.2 Dynamic Anonymity
Hiding their real identity is an imperative for people who do not like to
share their personal information or secrets with others. They do not want
others to get to know their meeting schedules with their business partners,
which books they buy and read, how much money they have in their bank
accounts, which transactions they execute with their credit cards, etc. Most
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Figure 5.2: The SALSA Client Security Architecture (extended)
people have a strong preference for staying anonymous as far as and when-
ever possible. In the Internet age, the number of interactions people have
with their environment (i.e. their business partners, companies, public ser-
vice organizations, etc.) has increased enormously. At the same time, the
anonymity requirement remains, although it has become more difficult to
meet. Staying anonymous when sending e-mails, visiting web pages, and
doing e-commerce is needed but not easy to achieve.
Analysis of the security requirements of mobile business environments
indicates that anonymity and protection of the mobile user’s personal data
is one of the greatest challenges [189, 105]. Although security and anonymity
are non-functional properties of a system, its user acceptance depends di-
rectly on these features.
We distinguish between two types of anonymity – content anonymity
and communication anonymity – which both have to be fulfilled in order to
provide complete anonymity. Pseudonyms can provide content anonymity
(unobservability [150]) by keeping the users’ real identities secret, but an
attacker who is able to sniff incoming and outgoing messages on the network
nodes can at least find out which nodes are communicating with each other.
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Figure 5.3: The SALSA Client Security Architecture - Secure Communica-
tion
This type of threat to anonymity can be averted by ensuring “unlinkability”
of user actions [150].
In this section, the solution, namely “Dynamic Anonymity” (that is rel-
evant to communication anonymity and unlinkability of user actions) is ex-
plained. Communication anonymity is referred to simply as anonymity in
the remainder of the section.
5.2.1 Existing Solutions for Anonymity
In the literature, existing solutions for communication anonymity and un-
linkability of user actions are categorized into three groups: proxies, peer-
to-peer (P2P) networks and Mix-net [129].
In a proxy-based solution, a trusted proxy (anonymizer) receives user
requests, rewrites some parts of the request in order to hide sender-specific
data and sends it to the final receiver. Replies from the receiver are in
turn forwarded to the real sender. The drawback of this scheme is that
users have to trust the proxy and there are no protection mechanisms in the
channel between users and proxies. For example, www.anonymizer.com is a
well-known proxy for anonymous web surfing.
CHAPTER 5. USER-CENTRIC PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 72
With the increasing popularity of peer-to-peer applications, communica-
tion anonymity solutions based on P2P networks have been designed (e.g.
Dining Cryptographers [102], mCrowds [163], Tarzan [112], etc.). Unlike
anonymizer proxies, there is no need for a trusted party within these sys-
tems and each user shares an encrypted secure channel with other users in
the P2P network. In 1988, David Chaum proposed the “Dining Cryptogra-
pher Protocol” for P2P anonymous communication. In this protocol, three
or more nodes are arranged over a ring network and each link between the
nodes is encrypted. Each participant picks a number randomly and forwards
it to the next participant to the right. Each participant then computes the
difference between his/her own number and the number he/she received.
If a participant wants to send a message, he/she adds it to the difference
and announces the result to the others. Then all participants add up the
announced numbers. At the end if the sum is 0, that means no one trans-
mitted a message. If the sum is a valid message, that means one participant
sent a message. If the sum is an invalid message, that means more than one
participant sent a message. Therefore, the protocol needs to be repeated
after waiting a random time. In mobile Internet communication, mCrowds
[88] presents an anonymity solution for P2P networks. In this solution, the
user chooses a random path (a user group) and sends the message along this
path to the final receiver.
The last type of solution is Mix-net, which is a more promising approach
for the M-Business framework compared to proxies and P2P networks. It
was first suggested by David Chaum for anonymous e-mail communication
[103]. A mix is a computer which resides between a sender and a receiver.
When a mix gets a message, it decrypts it and forwards the remaining
part to the next mix or the final receiver. A group of mixes composes a
network called Mix-net. Chaum’s traditional Mix-net was based on public
key operations, but today, Mix-net based solutions relying on symmetric
encryption also exist.
In mix-network based solutions the messages are encrypted and ex-
changed between different nodes positioned between the sender and the
receiver. Each node knows about the sender and the next node. There-
fore, the first node knows about the user but not the server and similarly
the last node knows about the server but not the user.
Mix-net based solutions are well accepted in academia and have also
been designed and deployed for different application scenarios. For ex-
ample, there are solutions for anonymous communication over ISDN net-
works (ISDN-Mixes [151]) and for anonymous email communication (smtp-
remailers [145]). Jap [32] and Tor [106] are recent Mix-net implementations
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focusing on anonymous web surfing. Their anonymity service is based on
the SOCKS protocol [132] and supports any application layer protocol (e.g.
ftp, p2p, http, https, etc.). However, Jap does not support protocols other
than HTTP due to some organizational reasons, and functions as an HTTP
proxy.
Jap has a cascade-style Mix-net (see Figure 5.4), whereas Tor supports
free nodes (see Figure 5.5). A Jap cascade consists of two or three mix
nodes in a fixed sequential order. The user can only choose the cascade but
no particular mix nodes. Supporting free nodes, Tor allows the choice of
arbitrary paths randomly through mix nodes.
In Jap, users start the client application and choose a cascade satis-
fying their anonymity requirement. Each cascade offers different levels of
anonymity based on the number of active users on the chosen cascade and
traffic parameters. Jap provides both premium and free anonymity services.
Premium services enable higher anonymity for paid users. As an example,
the free Jap cascade Dresden-Dresden managed by the Jap developers has
around 25 simultaneously active users on average [59].
In Tor, since the message route among free mix nodes is chosen randomly,
a higher level of anonymity can be achieved compared to the fixed mix order
of cascades. On the other hand, since anyone can participate as a mix
node within the Tor network, there are certain problems [95, 52]. The Tor
designers assume that the traffic between the user and the server is already
encrypted. Otherwise, the exit node in the Tor mix-network can sniff the
message networks. Based on this restriction, the Swede Dan Egerstad, who
was equipped with 5 Tor exit nodes, could sniff around 100 log-in credentials
belonging to different consulates in different countries. Jap has also certain
advantages over Tor. It supports dummy messages and time delays for
higher anonymity levels.
For more details about anonymity, you can refer to the selected papers
section of Free Haven (http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/ topic.html).
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Figure 5.4: Jap Architecture1
Figure 5.5: Tor Architecture2
5.2.2 New Anonymity Challenges
Mix-net solutions for anonymity require extra computations. In contrast
mobile devices used in context-aware applications are limited in terms of
hardware. Therefore, it is not a good idea to integrate Jap or Tor clients
into the M-Business framework and thus enable mobile users to communi-
cate anonymously via Jap or Tor networks. Additionally, mobile users and
applications may require different levels of anonymity. Applying a fixed level
of anonymity can yield weak security or poor performance problems.
1Referenced from https://www.jondos.de/en/
2Referenced from http://www.torproject.org/overview.html.en
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Operation Time Consumption on
Zaurus
SL-C3000 (416
MHz)
IBM Thinkpad
R51 (1.7 GHz)
RSA Key Generation (1024-bit
key)
122 seconds 2.2 seconds
RSA Encryption
(1024-bit key, 64-byte data)
172 ms 10 ms
RSA Decryption
(1024-bit key,128-byte data)
856 ms 40 ms
RSA Signing
(1024-bit key,64-bytes data)
833 ms 55 ms
RSA Verification
(1024-bit key, 128-bytes data)
169 ms 5 ms
AES Encryption/Decryption
(128-bit key, 2048-byte data)
583 ms 35 ms
SHA-1 Hash (2048-byte data) 111 ms 5 ms
Table 5.1: Performance of Cryptographic Operations
Limited Hardware Capabilities
In today’s Mix-networks, the sender is required to encrypt a message with
the symmetric key of each mix in the message route before sending. There-
fore, a key handshake process should be executed between the sender and
each mix in the route. These encryption and key handshake processes make
a heavy demand on processing power and are consequently time consuming
operations that mobile PDAs cannot tolerate. To illustrate, Table 5.1 shows
the performance of the required cryptographic operations3. The tests were
done on both a Zaurus SL-C3000 PDA (416 MHz CPU/64 MB RAM) and
an IBM Thinkpad R51 notebook (1.7 GHz CPU/1 GB RAM). For the im-
plementation, we used Bouncy Castle lightweight cryptographic APIs [100].
Note that 100% of CPU power was used during the test computations. Thus,
even if the priority of the cryptographic operations is decreased, other appli-
cations running on PDAs will hardly receive any CPU power while Mix-net
clients are executed.
3Not all operations in Table 5.1 are required for Mix-net clients, but for the sake of
completeness, we have also included the execution times for RSA key generation (normally
performed offline), decryption and digital signing.
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Dynamic Anonymity
Both Jap and Tor provide a fixed level of anonymity. You start your client
application with a particular configuration, and you cannot easily change or
manage your anonymity level afterwards. However, the M-Business frame-
work requires an anonymity feature that enables dynamic updates of anonymity
levels for the following reasons:
• Varying sensitivity of applications: In the M-Business framework, the
anonymity requirements of applications may differ totally. Consider
finding the nearest restaurant and mobile dating applications. Finding
nearest restaurant is a typical context-aware application. Holding your
PDA, you are interested in getting a list of restaurants which are near
to your current location. The second application type, context-aware
mobile dating, lets users search for suitable chat partners within a
particular area. Comparing these two types of applications, the latter
requires (at least initially) a very high level of anonymity, while the
former may not even need anonymity at all.
• Varying sensitivity of users: Users also tend to have different sensi-
tivity levels for anonymity. Consider a celebrity interested in having a
very high level of anonymity. He/She can even require a high level of
anonymity for the finding the nearest restaurant application and never
wants other people to know the places that he/she eats at.
• Enhancing performance: The previous two requirements point out
that enforcing a fixed level of anonymity is a security risk since the
anonymity level may be too low. An unnecessarily high anonymity
level makes, however, applications waste time waiting for cryptographic
operations and data transmission delays.
5.2.3 Towards A Solution
Considering varying sensitivity of applications and users and performance
problems, we propose a policy-based solution for communication anonymity.
The solution emerges existing mix-net based solutions. We have analyzed
different Mix-net architectures and found 6 parameters that affect the anonymity
level. These parameters can be dynamically specified for each user and appli-
cation individually within policies and each relevant policy can be enforced
when a specific business logic is executed.
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Anonymity Parameters
6 anonymity parameters exist, namely mix number, user number, message
size, message delay, time delay and dummy message. Their effects on
anonymity are as follows:
1. Mix number: This parameter specifies the minimum number of nodes
that participate in the Mix anonymization network. If there are more
nodes in the message route, traffic analysis becomes more difficult and
the anonymity level is increased. Setting this parameter to zero results
in a direct client-server communication, i.e. communication without
any Mix-net nodes. In the Jap architecture, each cascade consists of
two or three nodes. In contrast in the Tor architecture, anyone can
join to the Mix-network and become a node. This increases on one
hand the anonymity level, on the other hand it can threaten anonymity
because there is no control before a node joins into the network.
2. User number: In a cascade-style Mix-net like Jap, the number of ac-
tive users using a particular cascade affects the anonymity level. This
parameter defines the minimum number of users that should communi-
cate over a cascade. The more users participate in the communication,
the higher is the anonymity level of this cascade.
3. Fixed message size: Linkability of messages can be revealed by com-
paring message size sent over a channel. Preventing this threat, mes-
sages should have a fixed size. If this is provided, unrelated messages
would have also the same sizes, consequently the anonymity set be-
comes bigger and unlinkability and anonymity are provided.
4. Message delay: Upon receiving a message, a mix can either forward
the message to the next mix immediately or keep it in its outgoing
pool for a certain time period. If messages are immediately forwarded,
time delays of messages between mixes can be analyzed for linkability
similar to varying message size. Message delay parameter prevents
direct sending of messages and specifies the number of messages that
should exist in the outgoing pool of a mix before it starts forwarding
messages. When the number is exhausted, the mix chooses messages
randomly and forwards them to the next receiver. Enabling this op-
tion, traffic analysis becomes more difficult, and also additional delays
and latencies may be created.
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5. Time delay: This parameter is similar to message delay and prevents
immediate forwarding of messages based on time delays rather than
message quantities.
6. Dummy message: Enabling this parameter, each mix sends extra
dummy messages to other mixes when transmitting messages in or-
der to complicate traffic analysis.
5.2.4 The Architecture
Our anonymity architecture focuses on dynamic anonymity and configurable
anonymity parameters. In practice there are two approaches for the archi-
tecture: fat client and thin client approaches
The Fat Client Architecture
In the fat client architecture, mobile users communicate directly with the
Mix networks as illustrated in Figure 5.6. The Mix-net client applications
should run on mobile devices and carry out all relevant cryptographic oper-
ations (i.e. encryptions and decryptions). This architecture provides strong
anonymity, since there is no need for a trusted third party and the first node
can only know the mobile user, but not the service provider and similarly
the exit node (i.e. the last node) knows the service provider, but not the
mobile user. However, this architecture has some bottlenecks in terms of
performance and dynamic anonymity parameters.
Not all dynamic anonymity parameters are supported by the existing
Mix networks. Even if they are supported, it is not allowed to change these
parameters in the client applications. Therefore, a totally new client and
server applications should be implemented.
Performance is also a big problem. Based on our preliminary tests as
seen in Table 5.1, it takes a very long time for mobile devices to execute
primitive cryptographic operations. Setting up a route through the Mix-net
would imply sending several messages through a costly wireless connection.
Since the initialization of communication routes must be done repeatedly,
this would cause a tremendous number of packets to be carried on-air. As
a conclusion, even though this approach provides strong anonymity, it has
been realized that the computational power of PDAs in the market today is
too low to accomplish the fat client approach. Security as a non-functional
property of the M-Business framework should not prevent usability.
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Figure 5.6: The Fat Client Anonymity Architecture
The Thin Client Architecture
The alternative approach to the fat client architecture is the thin client
architecture. As illustrated in Figure 5.7, mobile users connect to a gateway
for communicating over the Mix networks. The gateway is a trusted third
party in the architecture and performs the major part of the computations
required for anonymity. This prevents the performance bottleneck due to
the Mix networks and it becomes even possible to eliminate latencies only by
modifying relevant policies. The gateway residing between mobile devices
and the Mix networks acts as a facade [113] and runs different types of Mix-
net client applications to forward messages over any client, e.g. Jap-client,
Tor-client, etc. In contrast mobile users can still specify the anonymity level
for each application individually.
One can argue that this architecture provides the same level of anonymity
as a simple proxy architecture. This is not totally true. As in proxy-based
solutions, the gateway is also a single point of failure and must be well
protected. It is the case that an attacker who cannot gain access to a
proxy but can sniff its outgoing network channels can still break anonymity
of users. This scenario is not possible with the thin client architecture,
because the gateway does not communicate directly with service providers
and therefore does not release the final receiver (i.e. service provider) in
message headers to the channel.
Even though we believe the fat client approach is more realistic and
provides better anonymity since it needs no trusted party, performance issues
on mobile devices did not allow us to implement it for the demo application of
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Figure 5.7: The Thin Client Anonymity Architecture
the M-Business research group. By implementing the thin client approach,
the performance of anonymity is not a problem anymore, the parameters
for dynamic anonymity can be enforced by the gateway and exploiting the
existing Jap and Tor networks becomes possible.
Application Manager, Policy Manager andAnonymity Manager are three
main components in the architecture on the client-side. Mobile users can
create policies for each individual application and specify the required pa-
rameters affecting anonymity level. They are stored on mobile devices within
the repository of the policy manager. When an application tries to send a
message, this request is taken by application manager and then forwarded
to the anonymity manager. Afterwards, the anonymity manager asks the
policy manager for the relevant policy of this particular application. Based
on the parameters in the policy, the application manager decides how to
proceed with the message transmission.
The gateway consists of three layers. In the first layer, the server in-
terface listens for incoming requests, parses the relevant destination and
anonymity parameters, and forwards them to the second layer, i.e., to the
Mix-net Client Manager (MCM). In the third layer, different Mix-net clients
are installed and deployed.
The MCM is responsible for managing different Mix-net client applica-
tions. The idea behind installing and managing more than one Mix-net
client application is that dynamic anonymity can be distributed through-
out several network types in order to achieve higher levels of anonymity.
Additionally, the MCM can run different instances of the same Mix-net
client with different configuration parameters and thereby enhance the dy-
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namic anonymity property. On receiving the payload data, destination and
anonymity parameters, the MCM chooses the suitable Mix-net client to send
the message.
For secure communication, mobile users need to establish only two chan-
nels, i.e. a channel between mobile user and the gateway and another
channel between mobile user and service provider. It should be noticed
that enabling secure communications over the Mix networks does not mean
that there is no need for secure channels between mobile users and service
providers [52].
Christian Beil implemented both the gateway and mobile client appli-
cations of this architecture and tested the client software on a PDA. The
gateway has been encoded in J2SE and the mobile client in J2ME using a
CDC configuration [203]. The gateway has been installed on the Broker-side
of the M-Business framework. The performance of our implementation is
sufficient for not decreasing the usability of applications while providing a
sufficient level of anonymity. For more details of the implementation such as
particular design choices and the communication protocol between mobile
users and the gateway, you can refer to [96].
Policies and Templates
Policies and templates exist in the anonymity architecture for the integra-
tion of dynamic anonymity features. Each template stored on the gateway
specifies a set of certain configurations (i.e. the Mix-net client instance,
time delay, message delay and dummy message). Each policy bound to a
certain application refers to a particular template contains three additional
parameters (i.e. mix number, user number, message size, message padding).
In order to enforce dynamic anonymity policies, the parameters should
be supported by the Mix networks. Both Jap and Tor support some of these
parameters. In a Jap network, one can choose a cascade based on active user
numbers. In the Tor-network, the minimum and maximum node numbers
can be configured. Tor also supports creating a new circuit after sending
a particular number of messages over an established channel. The dummy
message and time delay parameters are supported by Jap but it cannot be
changed on the client side. Therefore, the gateway emulates their effects. It
creates dummy Mix-net clients, and if a value is set for the dummy message
parameter, dummy messages are sent over this dummy Mix-net client. If the
time delay is set, the gateway keeps the message for a particular time and
then sends it over the Mix network. Applying time delays, timing attacks
against exchanged messages are prevented. Additionally, as an enhancement
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to dynamic reconfigurability, mobile users can specify within policies which
Mix-net client to use.
<anonConfig>
<defaultAnonTemplate id ="default">
<general>
<parameter name="dummyMessages">0</parameter>
<parameter name="timeDelay">0</parameter>
</general>
<provider name="Tor" host="localhost" port="9050" protocol="socks4a" />
</defaultAnonTemplate>
<anonTemplates>
<anonTemplate id="jap1">
<general>
<parameter name="dummyMessages">5</parameter>
<parameter name="timeDelay">3</parameter>
</general>
<provider name="JAP" host="localhost" port="4001" protocol="socks4a" />
</anonTemplate>
<anonTemplate id="tor1">
<general>
<parameter name="messageDelay">10</parameter>
</general>
<provider name="Tor" host="localhost" port="9050" protocol="socks4a" />
</anonTemplate>
<anonTemplate id="direct_withDelay">
<general>
<parameter name="timeDelay">2</parameter>
</general>
</anonTemplate>
<anonTemplate id="direct_default" />
</anonTemplates>
</anonConfig>
Figure 5.8: Samples of Anonymity Templates
Figure 5.8 show samples of anonymity templates encoded in XML. Each
template file contain a default anonymity template encoded in defaultAnon-
Template tag and also other specific templates encoded in anonTemplates.
For each template, general and provider parameters can be specified. The
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provider parameter represents the relevant Mix-net, i.e. Jap, Tor, etc. If
there is no provider specified, this results into direct communication with
service providers. In the general tag, the parameters, time delay, message
delay and dummy messages can be specified. Each template has a unique
identification and user policies can refer to template ids.
<anonPolicies>
<policy appID="app1">
<anonTemplate>tor1</anonTemplate>
<messageSize>512</messageSize>
<messagePadding>true</messagePadding>
<minMixNumber>3</minMixNumber>
<minUserNumber>500</minUserNumber>
</policy>
<policy appID="app2">
<anonTemplate>jap1</anonTemplate>
<messageSize>2048</messageSize>
<messagePadding>false</messagePadding>
</policy>
<policy appID="app3">
<anonTemplate>direct_default</anonTemplate>
<messageSize>1024</messageSize>
<messagePadding>false</messagePadding>
</policy>
<policy appID="app4">
<anonTemplate>direct_withDelay</anonTemplate>
<messageSize>1024</messageSize>
</policy>
</anonPolicies>
Figure 5.9: Examples of Anonymity Policies
Figure 5.9 illustrates sample anonymity policies and their bindings to
particular templates. Each policy can be bound to one or more applications
and refer to a certain template. In addition, message size, message padding,
minimum mix number and minimum user number parameters can be spec-
ified in policies. The message size parameter specifies the maximum size of
sent messages, and the message padding parameter specifies whether a fixed
or variable message size is used.
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5.2.5 Threat Analysis
During the communication, mobile users connect to the gateway and open
a channel through the Mix networks to service providers. Upon receiving a
message from a mobile user, the gateway encrypts the message and sends
it through the Mix network to the relevant service provider. In the threat
analysis, the goal of an attacker is assumed as revealing the relations among
communication partners by applying traffic analysis.
In the Mix networks, attackers can be categorized as follows:
• Passive or Active Attackers: Passive attackers are able to sniff and
capture the messages exchanged over the networks. Based on their fa-
cilities, they can seize messages sent from mobile users to the gateway,
messages sent among Mix-net nodes and messages exchanged between
the exit nodes in the Mix-net and service providers. Active attackers
can enforce all the sniffing attacks of passive attackers. Additionally,
they can insert, alter, or drop the exchanged messages.
• External or Internal Attackers: Attackers can be grouped as external
or internal based on their control over the principals (i.e. nodes or the
gateway) of the Mix networks. Controlling one or more mix nodes,
internal attackers can distinguish between dummy messages and ac-
tual data messages and can link incoming and outgoing messages of
their controlled nodes. Controlling the gateway is unacceptable for
the thin client architecture, since the gateway knows the sender and
the receiver of any message. An external attacker has no control over
any node or the gateway and therefore is less harmful compared to
internal attackers.
• Partial or Global Attackers: An attacker is “partial” if he or she can
influence only a part of the system. A global attacker can, however,
potentially threaten the entire architecture.
An attacker is commonly assumed to be global, passive, and external.
However, since the Mix-nets that underlie our architecture are not secure
against such attackers, our system is not, either. Additionally, a compro-
mised gateway would completely expose the identity of all users running
their traffic through it. However, users are reasonably protected against
active, internal and partial attackers who control only small number of mix
nodes, not including the gateway. We expect that attackers monitoring
the connection between mobile users and the gateway and controlling some
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nodes in the Mix networks and a number of service providers would not
compromise our anonymity model.
The intentions of attackers may vary. A service provider may be inter-
ested in the identities (i.e. e-mail and postal addresses, etc.) of its com-
petitor’s customers in order to target them with specific advertisements.
Another possible attacker is users who try to find out the providers with
whom their target user is communicating. Similarly, for the Friend Finder
applications, attackers can attempt to ascertain the relationships between
mobile users.
5.2.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Architectures
Two architectures (i.e. the fat client and the thin client) were proposed in
this section. Both architectures fulfill the requirements of dynamic anonymity,
i.e. applying configurable anonymity parameters.
The fat client architecture support a high level of anonymity compared
to the thin client architecture. It requires, however, a very large amount of
computational power which is lacking in small mobile devices.
In contrast the thin client architecture can support dynamic anonymity
and has the computational power available for anonymity promoting cryp-
tographic operations. Another advantage of this architecture is that it pro-
motes weak coupling between mobile devices and particular Mix-net im-
plementations, such that existing and well-established Mix-networks can be
integrated in a way that is transparent for mobile devices. Especially when
support of an additional Mix-net implementation is to be added to the frame-
work, the client component must only be deployed to the gateway but not
to mobile devices. From both security and software engineering points of
view, this is a very desirable property.
As a drawback, the thin client architecture requires an extra trusted
third party and this is a threat point for anonymity. In case the gateway
is compromised, anonymity fails. Therefore, it is very important as to who
operates the gateway. In the implementation, the broker, who already acts
as a trusted third party from the business point of view, deploys the gateway
since it is already a trusted third party in the M-Business framework.
5.2.7 Future Work
Supporting a higher level of anonymity, the fat client architecture should be
implemented for the M-Business framework if future mobile devices possess
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more computational power and can cope with time-consuming cryptographic
operations.
The concrete effects of the defined anonymity parameters and their com-
parison in terms of anonymity are open questions. For example, the concrete
effects of time delay and dummy messages regarding anonymity level are still
not well defined. Having implemented the thin client architecture, the next
step should be the study of the configuration parameters and their effects
on anonymity level.
Configuration parameters encoded within policies and templates provide
dynamic anonymity. However, it is neither realistic nor practical to expect
non-technical mobile users to specify their own policies and parameters for
each application. This process should be as easy as possible. For example,
users can choose from pre-defined anonymity levels, e.g. ranging from high
to low, for individual applications or the entire M-Business client.
5.3 Mobile Identity Management
Social, ethical and legal aspects require the protection of the privacy of
users on the digital Internet platform. With the introduction of new web
technologies, users transfer much of their personal data to other service
providers and Internet users. The danger of misuse of the collected personal
data threatens the privacy of users. Service providers can profile users, send
spam emails based on their profiling results, apply dynamic pricing which
means different people pay different amount for the same service, forward
and even sell data collected to third parties.
In contrast the privacy protection laws based on EU directives [15, 16]
regulate that personal data of an individual should not be retrieved without
his consent, not be used for other purposes rather than the stated pur-
pose, not be shared with others if that is not agreed before and be deleted
if the user withdraws his or her consent later. Technical system devel-
opers should take the privacy regulations into consideration and integrate
privacy-enhancing tools within their systems in order to help to guarantee
the privacy of individuals.
Identity is described as “one or more attributes, which are applicable
to this particular subject or object”4. A user can possess many identities
and each identity can be assigned to a number of his differing attributes.
Identity management helps individuals to control their personal data when
it needs to be shared with other parties and thus supports their privacy.
4Referenced from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity management
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Mobile users of context-aware applications also have identities that are
in interaction with other principals. In particular, the location attribute
of mobile users is a very sensitive context attribute and must be protected
against unauthorized access. Considering this, mobile identity management
has become an important requirement for context-aware applications.
Mobile identity management can be considered as a subgroup of identity
management. This statement is only partially true. The new context data,
especially location data, has its own characteristics and therefore not all
identity management solutions can be applied to mobile identity manage-
ment.
In this section, user-centric identity management within the Friend Finder
application is focused on and the most important privacy aspects from the
perspective of mobile identity management are examined and evaluated.
The aspects are not specific to mobile identity management, but their eval-
uation is mobile-centric.
5.3.1 Related Work of Privacy and Identity Management
Privacy and identity management are very active research topics in the
academic world. Many research projects exist focusing on different aspects
of supporting privacy and identity management.
P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences) [51] and Appel (A P3P Prefer-
ence Exchange Language) [3] are W3C recommendations and help individ-
uals to build a trust relation with servers and service providers. Servers
and service providers specify their data collection policies as P3P policies
and publish them. Users specify their privacy preferences in Appel format.
Before users communicate with servers, the P3P-capable user agents (e.g.
browsers) retrieve the server’s P3P policy on behalf of users, compare them
with the users’ Appel preferences. If any conflict exists between the policy
and the preferences, either the users are asked how to proceed or communi-
cation is stopped.
E-P3P (Enterprise Privacy Practices) [89] was IBM’s first attempt to
propose a privacy model to support privacy requirements and enforce policies
within enterprises. EPAL (The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language)
[90], as a successor of E-P3P, was designed by IBM and submitted to W3C
to become a standard. EPAL is an XML-based privacy policy specification
language aimed at organizations to enable them to formalize internal privacy
policies. Unlike P3P, EPAL takes into consideration the enforcement of
privacy rules and focuses on the B2B privacy domain.
Myles et al. propose an architecture for preserving privacy in environ-
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ments with location-based applications [108]. They extend the P3P policy
language in order to cover location-based applications as well. Mobile users
initially send their privacy preferences called validators to the central loca-
tion server. To make a location request for a particular user, the service
providers need to send their privacy policies to the location server. After-
wards, the validators are evaluated with the request and the relevant privacy
policy. If this process is successful, the location is sent to the provider.
The Geopriv project group [81] focuses on location privacy, i.e. autho-
rization, integrity and privacy requirements for the transfer of location in-
formation. The group has defined a standard for the secure and authorized
transmission of location information (e.g. coordinates, postal addresses,
etc.) and privacy policies over the Internet.
Confab [120] provides a customizable framework for building ubiquitous
computing applications. Through the analysis of the privacy requirements
of end-users and application developers, the framework also provides exten-
sions for managing location privacy and trust levels in applications.
pawS [130] is a privacy awareness system for ubiquitous computing en-
vironments. It uses P3P policies to specify privacy concerns for collected
data and the Appel language to specify the user privacy preferences. The
mobile device runs a mobile privacy assistant that communicates with the
ubiquitous devices, receives their privacy policies, compares them with the
user preferences and finally accepts or rejects the communication with the
ubiquitous device.
In the WASP project [74], the Appel language is extended to support
context-based applications. The extensions add support for date, time, day
of the week and location entities in the preference language. This is a good
approach to show that P3P can be extended to support context-based appli-
cations. However, these extensions only support basic context data. More
context data and the rules of context-to-context relations should also be in-
tegrated within the preference language (see Section 5.3.4). Providing this,
if some context values do not satisfy certain privacy conditions, sending this
context data can only be refused and using the service is continued as well.
The PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe) project [53]
is supported by the European Union’s Sixth Framework Program and the
Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science. The aim of PRIME is the de-
velopment of privacy-enhancing tools for identity management. idemix [29]
has been developed within the PRIME project and aims at achieving anony-
mous authentication in applications. The LBS [42] prototype of the PRIME
implements a demo of location-based applications for pharmacy search. The
demo application shows how privacy of personal data and pseudonymity
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can be protected against possible violations by mobile operators and service
providers. Unlike our focus on push services, the demo application consid-
ers only pull services. In addition, certain aspects like context relations and
dependencies, blurring in levels are not within the scope of the PRIME LBS.
The FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society) [18] project
is a Network of Excellence project and is supported by the European Union
under the 6th Framework Programme for Research and Technological De-
velopment. FIDIS focuses on topics such as future identity management,
identity theft, privacy in a legal-social context, mobility and identity, etc.
They have compiled a detailed database of identity management solutions
in academia and industry [19].
The NEXUS project at the University of Stuttgart focuses also on context-
aware applications and “envisions the World Wide Space to be the common
basis for future context- aware applications”. In their sub-project regard-
ing security and privacy, they propose [118] providing location privacy by
applying coordinate transformations. They show how location can be ren-
dered illegible and yet still facilitate the possibility of performing processing
operations required by location-based services.
Jendricke et al. present an identity manager to control personal data sent
from mobile devices through networks [122]. An identity manager provides
an interface with which one creates different virtual identifications (IDs), i.e.
pseudonyms, and binds a subset of his personal data to each ID. When com-
municating with a service provider, the user chooses an ID that is suitable
for this particular type of communication. Before any personal data is sent
to a service provider, the user is explicitly asked to confirm the transmission.
However, it should be realized that the identity manager covers only limited
aspects of mobile identity management for context-aware applications. As
examples, blurring in levels, history management, trust management and
context relations are not explicitly supported.
5.3.2 User-controlled Mobile Identity Management
Mobile users have security considerations and are anxious about the privacy
of their context, especially their location [86]. In many cases, they require
guaranteed context privacy, otherwise, they would refuse to use the service.
Some typical and specific questions regarding context privacy are:
• What happens if service providers collect my location information reg-
ularly and use this collected information to track me or to make user
profiles?
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• What if service providers record at what times during the day I fre-
quently use the services and send me advertisements at these times?
• What happens if the service providers share my location information
with third parties?
• Do service providers really need my location for this particular service?
• Is it enough if I give away my location information with a low resolu-
tion?
Mobile identity management helps users interacting with mobile appli-
cations to safeguard their personal data in the digital world as they do in
the physical life. You have many relationships with other people and orga-
nizations in society. You are, let’s say, a computer scientist, a husband, a
child, a friend or a stranger to a range of various people - all at the same
time. That means that you have many partial identities [150]. Each partial
identity is mapped to a group of attributes. You can intuitively decide which
partial identity is used for communicating with whom. You also switch from
one partial identity to another very easily and quickly. You can control as
to whom you trust and do not trust. This scenario also needs to be possible
in the digital world. You should be able to create different partial identities,
map a group of attributes to this identity and decide which partial identity
to use based on your communications partner.
Mobile identity management should go beyond the formulation of “which
attributes belong to which identity and which identity is used with whom”.
If you consider normal social life and conventions, you do not give away
any information about yourself to someone who might give this information
to other people. You build your trust relations automatically (and mostly)
unconsciously with others. You do not talk about your secrets with your
friends if others are around and can eavesdrop – this is something like secure
communication. Considering one’s location attribute, you do not reveal your
exact location to everybody endlessly. You often relate your exact location
in weekdays to your boss but at the weekend your boss does not need to
know your location (indeed, normally has no right to do so). However, it
is generally considered reasonable that your wife/husband can get to know
your location at anytime – this being independent of where you are. You
generally remember which information was given to which person (i.e. his-
tory management). If required, you prefer staying anonymous while you are
in interaction. When you buy something from supermarket, you do not need
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to (or want to) identify yourself. All these aspects are part of identity man-
agement and must be supported by mobile identity management solutions
in the digital world as well.
5.3.3 Privacy Policy in P3P
P3P aims to protect web users against Internet privacy risks. P3P server
policies are encoded in machine-readable XML format. Within a P3P policy,
a service provider can specify its identity data, the data it collects and the
reason, the retention period, the dispute policy, whether the users can be
identified with the collected data and the parties that can access the data.
In addition, the users specify their privacy preferences in Appel [3]. Before
a user starts communication with a service provider, the user’s P3P-enabled
agent retrieves the provider’s P3P policy, compares it with the privacy pref-
erences and interacts with the user in order to decide how to proceed in case
there is a conflict between the server’s policy and the user’s preferences.
If there is no conflict, the agent initializes communication with the service
provider.
P3P does not cover all user privacy aspects in context-aware applications,
because the main consideration of P3P is only the interaction between users
and service providers. In contrast, the user’s privacy issues are related to
the user himself/herself, the environment and other users as well. P3P only
controls data collection and forwarding privacy aspects. In Figure 5.10 and
5.11, a part of a sample P3P policy is given to show a typical privacy policy
specification.
Data such the name and contact information about the policy holder are
specified in the ENTITY tag. The policy specifies with the ACCESS tag
whether the user is allowed to view or update his/her collected data. In this
policy, the users are given access to all identified data. The privacy holder
defines the possible solutions for any disputes under DISPUTES-GROUP
tag. For example, this policy specifies that in case of any dispute the cus-
tomers can contact the customer service department. As a remedy the error
can be corrected, also the relevant law can specify the remedies or even
monetary damages can be paid to the users.
Each STATEMENT tag specifies a group of personal data, the purpose
of data collection, the consequences of various actions, identifiability, who
can access the data, and the retention time. The PURPOSE tag specifies
that the collected data can be used for both the main purpose which is for
the distribution in the Friend Finder application (implied by <current/>
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<ENTITY>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#business.name">Location Provider Service</DATA>
<DATA ref="#business.contact-info.online.email">p3p@example.com</DATA>
<DATA ref="#business.contact-info.online.uri">http://www.example.com</DATA>
<DATA ref="#business.contact-info.postal.organization">University</DATA>
<DATA ref="#business.contact-info.postal.street">University Address</DATA>
<DATA ref="#business.contact-info.postal.country">Germany</DATA>
</DATA-GROUP>
</ENTITY>
<ACCESS><all/></ACCESS>
<DISPUTES-GROUP>
<DISPUTES resolution-type="service"
service="http://www.example.com/p3p_dispute.html"
short-description="Dispute">
<LONG-DESCRIPTION>
For any inconvenience, apply to our Customer Service (dispute@example.com)
</LONG-DESCRIPTION>
<REMEDIES><correct/><money/><law/></REMEDIES>
</DISPUTES>
</DISPUTES-GROUP>
Figure 5.10: P3P Sample Policy
tag) or individual analysis for determining individual characteristics (implied
by <individual-analysis/> tag). RECIPIENT tag has the value <ours/>
which means only the service provider and its agents can access the personal
data. RETENTION tag has the value <stated-purpose/> which requires
information to be deleted at the earliest time possible.
Shortcomings of P3P/Appel
A user’s privacy preferences can be related to the service provider, the user
himself, other users and the environment as depicted in Figure 5.12. P3P
considers the privacy concerns of a user only in relation to service providers.
Therefore, the Friend Finder needs more comprehensive privacy policies for
user-centric privacy management.
P3P policies and Appel preferences should be extended to cover all user
privacy aspects. The shortcomings of P3P/Appel are relating to all privacy
factors are explained in the following subsections:
Factors relevant to Location Provider
By comparing P3P policies and user preferences, privacy of users can be
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<STATEMENT>
<EXTENSION optional="yes">
<GROUP-INFO name="Location"/>
</EXTENSION>
<CONSEQUENCE>
Location data will be collected with the aim of enabling the service.
</CONSEQUENCE>
<PURPOSE>
<current/><individual-analysis/>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/></RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.miscdata"><CATEGORIES><location/></CATEGORIES></DATA>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
Figure 5.11: P3P Sample Policy (cont.)
controlled. There are, however, still some shortcomings of P3P and Appel
as regards the privacy preferences of users.
Policy negotiation is not possible with P3P. However the privacy sen-
sitivity of users can vary and therefore service providers should be in the
position of presenting different privacy policies that enable negotiations to
be undertaken with differing users and their preferences.
P3P policies are static and do not support dynamic evaluation. For ex-
ample, quality of service based on the blurring level of the location cannot
be expressed in P3P. As a dynamic privacy aspect, a user may want to be
navigated to a certain restaurant if he gives his exact location. If he blurs
his location and gives only the zip code for example, then he could get a list
of the restaurants in that area as plain text. Such dynamic behaviors are
not considered in the P3P specification.
Factors relevant to the User (i.e. location owner)
At certain conditions, the user may not want to participate in the Friend
Finder service and reveal his location to others. As examples:
• at certain dates and times, e.g. on holiday, in the evenings, at the
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Figure 5.12: Privacy Concerns of Users
weekends, etc.
• based on the mood or status of the user, i.e. if the user is very unhappy
or away.
• based on location (if his location is a certain place, e.g. X street, only
then he reveals his location).
Factors relevant to Other Users
Based on the identity and context of other users, the user may not want
to reveal his location to particular users. As examples:
• Only the users with certain identities can access the location of the
user.
• Only the users that are at a certain location can access the location of
the user, e.g. the users that are in the same building as the user is in.
• Only the users that hold certain context data, e.g. users having similar
hobbies as the user himself
Environmental Factors
The user’s privacy concerns can also be affected by the environment such
as application type (i.e. indoor/outdoor application), physical conditions
(e.g. light, pressure, etc.), network infrastructure, etc. As examples:
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• The user participates in the service if the service is at an outdoor
application.
• In outdoor applications, the user releases his exact location (e.g. GPS
coordinates). Otherwise, he wants to blur his location and reveals only
building names instead of the floor name and/or room name/number.
Extensions to P3P/Appel
P3P and Appel need to be extended to enable them to be integrated within
an all-embracing privacy architecture for the Friend Finder or generally
speaking for context-aware applications. They should be extended in such a
way that they support negotiation and dynamic evaluation. Moreover, the
policy and preferences languages should be extended to support context-
based features stemming from the user, the environment and other users as
explained above. The context-based features of the user can be the user
identity (e.g. name, address, phone number, etc), the user profile (e.g. user
interests, schedule, etc.), his morale, his busyness, location and time. The
features of the environment can be physical conditions (e.g. light, pressure,
etc.) and the network infrastructure (e.g. indoor application, outdoor ap-
plication, etc.). The features of the other users are the same features that
the user himself has.
A close relationship exists between all these features in terms of privacy.
Each feature can affect other features in terms of privacy level. For example,
the feature identity is affected by the feature morale status. The user may
not want to share his location with another user if he is angry with him. Or
similarly, if the user is very unhappy, he would stop sending his location data
to the location provider in order not to let others know his location. As an
example for the relation between location and the network infrastructure,
the user would blur his location for indoor application, whereas he gives
his exact location for outdoor applications. It is clear from these examples
that any feature can be a privacy evaluation factor for another feature and
P3P/Appel should be extended in such a way that all these feature-to-
feature relations can be expressed in policies for user privacy management.
In Figure 5.13 depicting the feature relationships, it is shown that to
protect the features of the user and the environment, it should be possible
to evaluate all other features within privacy policies and preferences. After
the evaluation, the original private data can be released to others, or the
blurred/falsified version is released or the data is not transmitted.
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Figure 5.13: Feature Relations for Privacy
5.3.4 The Aspects
Based on their experiences and analysis of existing systems, Lederer et al.
[131] explain 5 pitfalls possibly met with the design of technical systems
related to personal privacy:
• The first pitfall is obscuring potential information flow. The technical
systems should let users know what kinds of information are being
collected about them, its purpose, duration and the receivers.
• The second pitfall is obscuring actual information flow. Users should
know exactly what actions are executed and nothing should be hidden.
For example, if a cookie is set-up on a users’ device, the user should
be informed.
• The third pitfall is emphasizing configuration over action. The systems
should not require very many configurations and expect users simply
to live with them.
• The forth pitfall is lacking coarse-grained control. Users should be in
the position of canceling any data transfer or blurring of personal data.
• The last pitfall is inhibiting established practices. Designs of technical
systems should employ privacy patterns (e.g. blurring, anonymization,
data limitation, etc.) effectively.
Considering all these pitfalls, the required aspects for identity manage-
ment are explained and evaluated from the perspective of the Friend Finder
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in this section. The aspects are not directly specific only to mobile iden-
tity management, but their evaluation is specific to context-aware mobile
applications.
Context-to-Context Dependence
A user can have both static context data such as name, surname, address
and dynamic context data such as current location, local weather conditions,
velocity in his car, etc. There is a very tight dependence between different
context data in terms of privacy. For example, a name-surname pair is
dependent on address data and vice versa. If someone knows your name and
surname, it is not so difficult to find out your address. That means if you
give away your name-surname, you also give away your address. Similarly in
location-aware applications, if you know someone’s current location with the
velocity and direction, it is not difficult to reveal his future location within
a one hour. Considering the Friend Finder application, it is not difficult to
find out the identity of a particular person if you get to know his friends
list. Mobile identity management systems should allow users to specify their
privacy preferences. You can explicitly specify which of your personal data
is released or not released.
The context2context dependence aspect should be integrated within mo-
bile identity management system of the Friend Finder application. In case
any logical conflicts exist during data release, mobile users should be warned
and asked how to proceed by the mobile identity management system. If
this is provided, the pitfalls regarding “obscuring potential and actual in-
formation flow” can be avoided.
Context-to-Context Relation
During the management of privacy preferences, your choices are affected by
the relations between different context data. As a simple example, there
is a relation between the location and time. You can specify a preference
such as “I do not want to release my location at the weekends”. Similarly,
a location:(time,person) relationship can also exist. “I want my boss to get
to know my location only at weekdays” is an example of such a relationship.
A location:own location relationship can be explained with the example “I
do not want to reveal my location if I am in Stuttgart”. The relation loca-
tion:remote location can be given as “I do not want to reveal my location if
the other party is not in the same building as me”. Static data can also have
this kind of relation. interest:interest relation for location-based chat means
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that “I release my interests only to people who hold the same interests”.
The context2context relation aspect should be also a part of the mobile
identity management system of the Friend Finder application. Its privacy
preference language should support specifying context2context relations in
terms of privacy. This aspect, as a privacy pattern, avoids the pitfall of
“inhibiting established practices”.
Blurring in Levels
Blurring of a personal data means revealing personal data not in an exact
form but rather in ranges or in a more abstract form. Blurring can help to
protect privacy and identity. You can give out your exact salary, but this
data can give hints about your job status and life standard. If possible,
salary should be given in ranges which make such conclusions more difficult.
Location blurring can also be applied. Location tracking can be prevented
by applying blurring. For certain applications, it should be enough to give
only the city name or zip code5 instead of exact GPS coordinates. For
indoor applications, location blurring can be also very helpful. Giving an
exact room number (which you are in, in a hotel) is not something you
would prefer to reveal unless really necessary. Instead, you can blur it and
reveal only the building name if it does not hurt the functionality of the
application.
Blurring can be applied in levels. For example, for outdoor locations;
GPS coordinates, street name, zip code, city, country and continent can
compose such location levels. For indoor locations; room number, floor
number and building name can define the levels. Blurring in levels can also
be used to improve the quality of service. Assume you are holding your
PDA and are in the Stuttgart city center. You are interested in finding
near-by restaurants. You can either give your exact GPS coordinates or
you can reveal your zip code (PLZ) or city name. If you release your GPS
coordinates, the service provider provides a map graphic which directs you
to different restaurants in the neighborhood. If you give only the zip code,
then you get the restaurants as a simple text list with addresses.
Blurring can improve the privacy and also the quality of service. The
pitfall “lacking coarse-grained control” can be avoided by the integration of
blurring in levels aspect. Hence, the mobile identity management system of
the Friend Finder application should support blurring mechanisms for any
possible context data.
5It should be noted that zip codes differ between countries – for example, in the UK
the Post Code sometimes identifies a unique house/flat.
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Extensible Preference Language
The specification language for privacy preferences is very important for mo-
bile identity management. Appel [3] as a privacy preference language has
limitations as to identity management [115]. Selection of a group of per-
sonal context data to release based on privacy policies is not fully supported
by Appel to be integrated within context-aware applications. Therefore,
the preference language for the Friend Finder application should take into
consideration explicitly the different static and dynamic context data, their
dependencies and relations and also blurring in levels.
The proposed extension for such a preference language is illustrated in
Figure 5.14. User privacy preferences are encoded in xml format. The mobile
identity management system of the Friend Finder rejects any data release
unless any exception has been defined by the mobile users for a particular
role (i.e. group of persons) or a person. The context data to be protected
is defined with the tag protected and its attribute property. Each protected
element contains one or more exception tags which consist of the attributes
role and id and if tags for the validation of the exceptions. The exception
can be defined for a certain group with the attribute role or a certain person
with the attribute id. An exception is also evaluated as true, if only all if
conditions are validated as true. Each if tag contains a context attribute (i.e.
the context data for validation), a condition attribute (i.e. the comparison
structure) and a value attribute.
<protected property="location|name|interests|velocity">
<exception role="family|work|private|..." id="wife|boss|..">
<if context="location" condition="is|is-not" value=" " />
<if context="time" condition="is|is-not|before|after" value=" " />
<if context="interest" condition="similar|not-similar" value=" " />
</exception>
.....
</protected>
Figure 5.14: The Structure of Exceptions for Privacy Preferences
As a concrete example, you want your boss to access your location in-
formation only at week days from 9.00 to 18.00 and your wife to access it
anytime unless you are within Germany. The relevant preferences can be
expressed as in Figure 5.15. Similarly, if you want to reveal your interests
only to persons whose interests are similar as yours, the relevant privacy
preferences can be defined as in Figure 5.16.
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<protected property="location">
<exception role="family" id="wife">
<if context="location" condition="is-not" value="Germany" />
</exception>
<exception role="work" id="boss">
<if context="time" condition="is-not" value="weekend" />
<if context="time" condition="between" value="09.00-18.00" />
<if context="location" condition="is-not" value="Germany" />
</exception>
</protected>
Figure 5.15: A Sample of Privacy Preferences for Location
<protected property="interest">
<exception role="*">
<if context="partner_interest" condition="similar"
value=$own_interest />
</exception>
</protected>
Figure 5.16: A Sample of Privacy Preferences for Interests
Trust Management with P3P
After releasing your personal data to a service provider, you cannot control
whether your data is misused or not. It can then be used for profiling,
forwarded to other parties, used for spamming, etc. You need some trust
relation with your partners before you release your data. With P3P [51], you
can build this trust relation with your partners. P3P does not guarantee
the enforcement of the policies, but it can be evaluated as a promise of
providers.
Mobile identity management systems should be equipped with P3P sup-
port and its preference language should be extended as explained in the
previous section. Integration of P3P avoids the pitfalls of “obscuring actual
and potential information flow” and “lacking coarse-grained control”. More-
over, before any data is released to service providers, mobile users are asked
to give permission or not for the transmission. This is an extra mechanism
for avoiding the relevant pitfalls.
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Status as Soft Shut-Down Button
The privacy requirements of users are directly related to the status and
mood of users. If a user is busy or away, he would not want to interact with
any application. Similarly, if he is very angry or upset, he might refuse to
take part in any mobile service. Therefore, a status option is a necessity
for the mobile identity management system of context-aware applications.
If a mobile user switches his status from online to offline, any data release
should be automatically stopped.
The avoidance of the pitfall “lacking coarse-grained control” requires a
simple mechanism to cut off the transfer of data, and with a simple status
option, this can be achieved in the mobile identity management system for
the Friend Finder application.
History Management
History management in mobile identity management systems allows mobile
users to follow their past activies (i.e. the released context data, date, time,
the corresponding partner, etc.). In addition, history management allows
users to interact directly with the receivers of their personal data, inform
them about the cancellation of their consent and make them delete their
personal data from their media.
Integrating history management within the Friend Finder’s identity man-
agement system, mobile users would be able check at any time to whom they
have given away their location information. Therefore, the pitfalls “ob-
scuring potential and actual information flows” and “inhibiting established
practice” are avoided.
Confidential Data Management
With the increasing popularity of mobile devices, confidentiality of mobile
data has become more critical. Many mobile devices (e.g. laptops, PDAs,
mobile phones) are either forgotten in taxis or public transport or they
are stolen. If the data stored on mobile devices are not encrypted, the
confidentiality of personal data is compromised.
Mobile identity management systems deal with personal data that are
normally very sensitive. Therefore, mobile identity management system
should apply encryption techniques “on the fly” and prevent illegal access
of unauthorized people to confidential information. This aspect is related to
privacy patterns and thus avoids the pitfall “inhibiting established practice”.
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Content and Communication Anonymity
Content anonymity requires staying anonymous at the application level.
Pseudonyms can be used for enforcing content anonymity. Communication
anonymity is related to network level anonymity. If a user communicates
directly with a service provider, he leaves many signs that can be used for
revealing the real identity of the user6. Communication anonymity net-
works and the relevant tools [62, 32, 106] today exist for preventing service
providers from identifying users.
Mobile identity management systems should be equipped with such tools
and pseudonym-support and enable users to communicate anonymously
both at application and network level. If this is provided, the pitfall “in-
hibiting established practice” is avoided. Additionally, the mobile identity
management hides the complexity of enforcing anonymity from users and
therefore avoids the pitfall of “emphasizing configuration over action”.
5.3.5 Integration of the Aspects
In this section, the aspects explained in the previous section are integrated
within the Friend Finder application. The integration is illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.17. In the example, the location provider as a trusted party exists and
collects location information from mobile users. Mr. Fischer, as a mobile
user, allows his wife and his boss to query his location and track his move-
ments on a visual map displayed on their mobile devices. The map provider
receives the location information of mobile users from the location provider
and presents them on a visual map for the mobile users.
The aspects in this application scenario are as follows: Before commu-
nicating with the location provider, mobile users specify which static and
dynamic data are sent to the location provider. As shown in the Figure 5.17,
Mr. Fischer releases his location information at the city level. This is the
integration of the aspect “blurring in levels”. Additionally, he can push the
button “Manage Appel Prefs.” and specify his Appel privacy preferences
for the trust management with the location provider and map provider. He
can also specify some exceptions related to the aspect context-to-context re-
lations such as “my location information should be sent to my boss only on
weekdays from 09.00 to 18.00” or “my location information should be sent
to my wife on any day when I am in Germany”. In order to express such
relations, an extensible preference language is needed. These are the inte-
6For a complete list of data revealed in case of direct communication, refer to
http://gemal.dk/browserspy/
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Figure 5.17: The Aspects integrated in the Friend Finder Application
gration of the aspects context-to-context relation and extensible preference
language. Mr. Fischer can also access his history data summarizing what
kind of information was released, at what time and to whom by pressing the
“History” button. This is the “history management” aspect.
Afterwards, Mr. Fischer presses the “Apply” button and the commu-
nication with the location provider starts. Initially, the P3P policy of the
location provider is retrieved and compared with his Appel preferences (i.e.
the aspect trust management with P3P). If there is no conflict, he is asked
to confirm that his location data will be sent periodically. At this point,
the aspect “context-to-context dependence” comes into play. Mr. Fischer
did not choose the attribute “weather condition” to be released. However,
since the current location as the city name is released, it is also clear that
the receiver can easily find out this attribute. He is warned against this
conflict. If he confirms, his location is sent, within a set period of time,
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to the location provider. Initially, he also sends his Appel preferences and
context relation rules. The location provider takes his preferences and the
exceptions into consideration and evaluates them before his location data is
forwarded to other principals.
When the visual map provider asks for his location information, the lo-
cation provider compares his Appel preferences and the P3P policy of the
visual map provider. It also checks the exceptions for the context relations
and then releases the relevant data to the visual map provider. In addition,
if Mr. Fischer communicates directly with the map provider, the communi-
cation is built upon an anonymous network automatically (i.e. the aspect
anonymity).
Chapter 6
Software-centric Proposed
Solutions
6.1 Software Engineering for Security
It is a common saying within the security community that people are the
weakest link in the security chain. This is also true for software engineering
relating to security. The implementation of a security protocol can be secure
if only the specification of the protocol is also secure. For example, after
17 years of its publication it was realized that Needham-Schroeder protocol
[146] was not a secure protocol [135]. Since the specification is insecure, its
implementations are also insecure.
However, secure specifications do not always result in secure implemen-
tations and this is mostly due to software developer errors. Recently, a
very critical error was discovered in Debian openssl packages [13], for exam-
ple. The problem was that the random number generator of Debian openssl
was not sufficiently random, because one of the Debian developers wrongly
changed a single line of code in September 2006 within the original openssl
packages while trying to silence a warning message. As a result, SSH keys,
OpenVPN keys, DNSSEC keys, key material for use in X.509 certificates
and session keys used in SSL/TLS connections all affected by this bug and
all Debian and Debian-based distributions had to be checked against weak
key problems and the keys needed to be regenerated. This also shows that
a small security mistake in software engineering can result in very critical
failures. Moreover, people are the weakest link in the chain and it is sure
more similar bugs will exist in our lives in the future.
Prevention of security bugs in applications has been studied for a long
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time in academia and industry as well. One method is code review and
penetration testing. Once the code is written, security experts can look for
possible bugs by applying black and white box techniques [138] and try to
apply countermeasure for the found bugs.
It is the case that testing applications and fixing bugs show only existence
of bugs and not their non-existence. Other techniques are required to remove
bugs before they appear in application code. Separation of codes [182, 126,
198] is a good technique to improve quality of application code in terms
of security. In aspect-oriented programming [127], you separate functional
business code from non-functional code (called aspects) (e.g. security, error
handling, logging, etc.). In this case, security experts can focus only on the
security aspects and application developers only need to take care of the
business logic. Application developers can not easily modify security code,
since they are physically separated. This improves the security development
process.
However it should not be forgotten that security experts are also human
beings, who can be in different psychological and physical situations and who
can also code security bugs unintentionally. It is known that security bugs
are very costly compared to simple application bugs. One further step in the
prevention bugs due to security experts is the automation of code genera-
tion. If final source code can be generated from security specifications in an
automated way, then it can be concluded that the security implementation
is also secure1.
In the M-Business project, the cryptographic compiler LaCoDa (The
Language for Code Generation and Protocol Analysis) which generates final
source code from high level security protocol specifications has been imple-
mented. It should be noted that the LaCoDa provides its own language for
protocol specifications.
6.2 LaCoDa: The Cryptographic Compiler
The M-Business framework requires many security components and proto-
cols integrated within service provider and mobile user applications. Appli-
cation developers are not security experts – and even security experts might
overlook certain security checks. As a result, implementing security func-
tions from specifications is an error-prone task. LaCoDa (The Language for
Code Generation and Protocol Analysis) is an attempt to to automate the
generation of security implementations from security specifications in order
1with the assumption that the code generator is also error-free.
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to reduce or prevent the developer bugs which have an adverse effect on
security.
The LaCoDa project provides both a specification language for security
protocols and a compiler for generating final source code (however, currently
only in Java) from specifications. The objectives were the creation of suitable
specification language and then the design and development of a related
compiler. As a result of analyzing the existing specification languages of
verification tools (e.g. Capsl [141], Casper [114], Hlpsl [64], Laeva [193])2, it
was concluded that they are not suitable for source code generation and the
specification language and the compiler need to be designed from scratch.
The LaCoDa compiler project was initiated within the Master’s the-
sis namely “Design and Implementation of a cryptographic Compiler” [170]
written by Nico Schmoigl. The compiler and the specification language were
developed within this master thesis. Afterwards, the analysis and testing of
the compiler has been completed within the Bachelor thesis namely “Test
and further development of LaCoDa compiler” [125] written by Sylvie Kegne.
Finally, adding new features and functionalities to the initial LaCoDa com-
piler has been carried out in a semester project work [83] completed by
Andre Zoelitz, Xing Li and Juliane Lenz.
In this section, the architecture and the features of the specification
language regarding LaCoDa are explained.
6.2.1 The Architecture
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, the LaCoda compiler consists of two parts –
namely the front-end the back-end. The front-end receives high-level speci-
fications of security protocols as input and generates tokens of the protocols
into XML-based parse trees saved as external files. The back-end gets the
parse trees and optionally the settings from template files, and finally gen-
erates source code for the relevant target platforms. The back-end is split
into two parts – the Connector and Translator. The Connector enriches
parse trees based on the information from templates (e.g. fixed key lengths,
specific hash algorithms, etc.) or cryptographic object information. The
Translator generates target platform specific code from enriched parse trees.
To support more target platforms, one needs only to implement the relevant
translators for LaCoDa. LaCoDa is designed to generate source code for
different languages (e.g. Java, C, Ada), but currently it generates only Java
code.
2For more information about the existing verification languages, refer to [170]/Section
2: Vorherige Arbeiten (in German)
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Figure 6.1: The Architecture of LaCoDa
6.2.2 The Specification Language
The LaCoDa specification language is object-oriented and utilizes crypto-
graphic objects. There are two types of parameter definition, i.e. parameters
and variables. Parameters (keyword param) are used for the communication
with the environment, whereas variables (keyword var) store only internal
computation results for temporary duration. Parameters can also be de-
fined as shared (keyword shared). Public keys can be given as an example
of shared parameters. A parameter can also be restricted with the key-
words in and out, i.e. showing that a parameter is an inbound or outbound
parameter respectively.
During protocol execution, it should be possible to check certain con-
ditions and even fail if required. For example, if comparison of two hash
values fails, the execution should be stopped. LaCoDa uses the keywords
assert for compile time and ensure for run-time checks. The keyword fail
triggers a halt in protocol execution.
Template types can be used to define abstract types during the design of
protocols. Concrete definitions of primitives are retrieved from template files
during compile time. As an example, SymmetricChipherKey in template
type can be replaced with AES256 from template file.
The message block in protocol specifications lists the exchanged mes-
sages between communication parties in order. While the specification lan-
guage focuses on message-based view of protocols, final source code have
rather role-based views.
Additionally, there are other certain features supported by the LaCoDa
specification language:
• IF-THEN-ELSE: The concept of “IF-THEN-ELSE” is supported by
the LaCoDa to check certain conditions and values during protocol
CHAPTER 6. SOFTWARE-CENTRIC PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 109
execution.
• Loops: “repeat-loops” is supported by the LaCoDa. The syntax of
loops is as follows:
A,B: repeat
A : x := rnd (...);
A -> B : x -> y;
until A:(x >3)
until B:(y >3)
end repeat ;
• Import of libraries / Call of sub-protocols: For complex protocols, it
is very useful to benefit from existing libraries and LaCoDa protocols.
The features of “importing libraries” and “calling of sub-protocols”
are supported by the LaCoDa.
• Functions: The features of “defining a function” and “calling a func-
tion” are supported by the LaCoDa.
For further information regarding the language notation, you can refer
to the Appendix C which gives the language syntax in EBNF (Extended
Backus-Naur-Form) form.
6.2.3 Template File
The high-level protocol specifications do not consider concrete cryptographic
primitives and only defines them in an abstract way. “HashFunction” is more
within its concern, rather than concrete MD5 or SHA1 functions. It is the
case that the translator requires concrete values to accomplish its task. This
gap is filled with the use of template files.
Another functionality of template files is that it enables dynamic re-
placement. If you need to replace SHA1 with SHA256, you do not need
to make any changes within the specification, but only modify the relevant
template file. In addition, you can specify certain lengths of primitives such
as minimum key length, minimum hash length, etc.
In Figure 6.2, an example of template file is given. In this template
file, the symmetric cipher is defined as AES with key size 128. The MAC
primitive is defined as OMAC with key size 128 and MAC size 64.
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S = AES
S.keysize = 128
M = OMAC
M.keysize = 128
M.Tag.size = 64
Figure 6.2: Template File Example
6.2.4 Concrete Example: Encrypt-then-Authenticate Proto-
col
Encrypt-and-Authenticate is a protocol which guarantees confidentiality and
authenticity of exchanged messages between two parties. In the protocol,
both parties share one secret key for encryption and another secret key for
the computation of message authentication code. The sender party encrypts
the message and also computes the message authentication code (MAC) of
the enciphered message and send both to the receiver. The receiver party
firstly computes the MAC of the received cipher message and compares it
with the MAC received. If they are identical, the authentication succeeds
and the receiver also decrypts the message for further processing. The spec-
ification of this protocol with message flows in LaCoDa is shown in Figure
6.3.
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system EncryptThenAuthenticate {
template {
S : SymmetricCipherKey;
M : MacKey;
assert(S, key_size >= 80);
assert(M, key_size >= 80);
assert(M.Tag, size >= 32);
}
param shared {
in kEnc : S;
in KAut : M;
}
param A {
in B : Party;
shared kEnc;
shared KAut;
in send_message : BitStream;
}
param B {
in A : Party;
shared kEnc;
shared KAut;
out receive_message : BitStream;
}
var A {
ciphertext : BitStream;
}
var B {
c_txt : BitStream;
aut_tag : M.Tag;
}
messages {
A : ciphertext := kEnc.encrypt( send_message );
A -> B : ciphertext -> c_txt;
A -> B : KAut.MAC_generate(ciphertext) -> aut_tag;
B : if KAut.MAC_verify(c_txt, aut_tag) = 0 then
fail(1);
endif
B : receive_message := kEnc.decrypt(c_txt);
}
}
Figure 6.3: The protocol specification of the Encrypt-then-Authenticate3
3Referenced from [170]
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The specification can be interpreted as follows:
• The name of the protocol specification is EncryptThenAuthenticate.
• In the template block, minimum key lengths of symmetric cipher (i.e.
S) and MAC (i.e. M), and also minimum length of MAC result are
specified.
• In the param shared block, encryption (i.e. kEnc) and authentication
(i.e. kAut) keys are defined as shared parameters.
• In the param A block, communication party (i.e. B) and the message
to be sent (i.e. send message) are defined as in parameters.
• In the param B block, communication party (i.e. A) as in parameter
and the message to be received (i.e. send message) as out parameter
are defined.
• In the var A block, the computed encryption result (i.e. ciphertext) is
defined.
• In the var B block, the received encryption result (i.e. c txt) and the
received MAC result (i.e. aut tag) are defined.
• In the messages block, the computed and exchanged messages between
communication parties are listed.
Based on the specification above and the template file in Figure 6.2, the
LaCoDa compiler generates Java source code for Party A (i.e. EncryptThe-
nAuthenticate A.java) and Party B (i.e. EncryptThenAuthenticate B.java)
as shown in Appendix B.1 and B.2 respectively.
6.2.5 Implementing Security Protocols
For testing the flexibility of the specification language and the functionality
of the compiler, Sylvie Kegne implemented some test cases using LaCoDa
[125]. The following steps were applied for the test:
• Choosing the security protocols: 13 common security protocols were
chosen from the SPORE (Security Protocols Open Repository) [178].
These protocols are: Ban modified Andrew Secure RPC, Loew modi-
fied Ban concrete Andrew Secure RPC, CCITT X509, Loew modified
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Denning-Sacco shared key, Diffie-Helmann, Kao Chow Authentica-
tion v3, Kerberos v5, Kehne-Schoenwaelder-Landendoerfer, Needham-
Schroeder Symmetric Key, Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three Pass, Smar-
tRight view-only, Wired Equivalent Privacy and Woo-Lam Pi 3
• Encoding the protocols in LaCoDa: Each security protocol was en-
coded with the specification language of LaCoDa for examining the
compiler.
• Running the compiler: For generating final Java code, the compiler
was executed with the encoded security protocols and the compiler
was analyzed.
• Compiling and running the final source code: In the final step, the
source code generated by LaCoDa was compiled using a Java compiler
and the generated class files were executed to test the data flow of the
security protocols.
Based on the results from the tests, the following extensions were added
to LaCoDa:
• Network Communication Layer: During the execution, the involved
parties in the protocol should be able to exchange messages on the
network layer. A socket-based communication layer was implemented
and integrated into LaCoDa.
• New Objects at Compile-time: The compiler needs certain crypto-
graphic objects (i.e. CO) files to generate final code from the spec-
ification. For example, if a hash function is used as a type in the
specification, the relevant CO file should be available for the compiler.
Hash, Timestamp, Checksum and Bignumber object files were created
and added to the compiler. The object Bignumber is required by the
Diffie-Hellman protocol. The object Nonce already existed within the
LaCoDa, but add and subtract methods, which are required by some
protocols like BAN modified Andrew Secure RPC, were not imple-
mented.
• New Objects at Run-time: The specification language defines pro-
tocols in an abstract way. It requires the message to be exchanged
between two parties to be encrypted, but does not specify which al-
gorithm is to be used for encryption. For the concrete mapping of
algorithms, templates are used. The specified algorithms should be
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available to the compiler as well. As a result, AES for symmetric
encryption and OMAC for message authentication code were imple-
mented for the compiler.
6.2.6 Discussion
Even though LaCoDa is at an early stage, it has been successful in showing
that is a powerful method for reducing the number of security bugs. The
next step in the development of LaCoDa should be its integration within a
larger number of software development processes. If this is done, there will
be a need for further development – including enhancements to the compiler
and the language itself.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
The provision of automatic location determination, context-aware and loca-
tion-aware applications has enabled a new trend in mobile business and
mobile commerce transactions. The existing applications (e.g. mobile navi-
gation, child tracking, automatic panic alarms and restaurant finders) have
already brought additional benefits to the daily lives of many people by
helping to overcome these complicated problems.
In contrast, security and privacy have become the biggest barriers against
the long-term success of these applications, since mobile users and service
providers are afraid of being disadvantaged by internal or external attackers.
In this thesis, different aspects of security and privacy are studied as regards
context-aware applications and from the perspectives of mobile users and
service providers.
Chapter 1 gave an introduction into this topic, the M-Business research
group at the University of Mannheim and the thesis. In Chapter 2, common
terms and concepts that are used through the thesis are explained and a
categorization of context-aware applications is given. Existing context-aware
applications, the target application scenarios within the thesis and location
determination techniques are also examined and explained in this chapter.
Chapter 3 introduced the principles of information security and gave the
results of our security analysis of context-aware applications by detailing
possible threats and solutions.
Chapter 4 explained the possible privacy challenges in a specific context-
aware application (i.e. Friend Finder) and also the legal aspects based on
EU data protection and e-privacy directives. To illustrate real life threats,
privacy risks appeared in the media and Google hacking exploits (with pos-
sible countermeasures suggested) were also analyzed in this chapter.
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In Chapter 5, user-centric solutions are explored and proposed. A client
security architecture consisting of different security components was intro-
duced. The architecture of the dynamic anonymity solution enabling policy-
based anonymity for mobile users was explained in detail. The new aspects
of context-aware applications in terms of mobile identity management and
their integration within the M-Business framework concluded this chapter.
In Chapter 6, software-centric solutions are explored and proposed. This
chapter was dedicated to our cryptographic compiler LaCoDa which gener-
ates final Java code from high level specifications of security protocols and
thus minimizes or even prevents security bugs stemming from application
developers.
Security and privacy measures are difficult to enforce, since they require
not only technical countermeasures but also social countermeasures. On
mobile platforms, the problem is more difficult to resolve and the conse-
quences of failure more serious. However we expect that mobile devices
will be improved and will provide more performance. They will be capable
of implementing highly sophisticated security techniques. Security requires
education of people. Real life security failures (e.g. online banking frauds)
often appear in the media and people are becoming more aware of possible
threats and are becoming more sensitive as to their personal data security
and privacy. New security threats are, however, constantly being discovered
and new risks are becoming apparent. Therefore more researchers are ex-
pected to explore the mobile security domain with a focus on service-oriented
architectures.
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Appendix A
Acronyms
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
API Application Programming Interface
APPEL A P3P Preference Exchange Language
ARM Advanced RISC Machine
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
B2B Business to Business
B2C Business to Client
CDC Connected Device Configuration
CIA Confidentiality Integrity Availability
CO Cryptographic Object
CPU Central Processing Unit
DoS Denial of Service
EBNF Extended Backus-Naur-Form
EPAL The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language
E-BUSINESS Electronic Business
E-COMMERCE Electronic Commerce
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E-P3P Enterprise Privacy Practices
FIDIS Future of IDentity in the Information Society
GEM Generic Environment for Mobile Business
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Global System for Mobile
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
I/O Input/Output
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LACODA Language for Code Generation and Protocol Analysis
LAMBADA Location-Aware Mobile Business Adhoc Architecture
TLS Transport Layer Security
MAC Message Authentication Code
M-BUSINESS Mobile Business
MCM Mix-net Client Manager
M-COMMERCE Mobile Commerce
PC Personal Computer
PDA Personal Digital Assistant
PET Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PIN Personal Identification Number
PRIME Privacy and Identity Management for Europe
P3P Platform for Privacy Preferences
RPC Remote Procedure Call
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SALSA Software Architectures For Location-Specific
Transactions in Mobile Commerce
SPKI Simple Public Key Infrastructure
SPORE Security Protocols Open Repository
SSL Secure Socket Layer
SSO Single Sign On
TAN Trans-Aktions-Nummer
TLS Transport Layer Security
UAProf User Agent Profile
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
WS-SECURITY Web Services Security
W3C The World Wide Web Consortium
XML Extensible Markup Language
XSS Cross Site Scripting
Appendix B
LaCoDa Sample Output
Code
B.1 Class File for EncryptThenAuthenticate A.java
import cryptort.*;
import cryptort.exceptions.*;
public class EncryptThenAuthenticate_A extends cryptort.CryptoSystem {
public EncryptThenAuthenticate_A() {
super();
}
public void init() { }
private OMAC KAut;
public void setKAut(OMAC ref) {
this.KAut = ref;
}
private Party B;
public void setB(Party ref) {
this.B = ref;
}
private BitStream send_message;
public void setsend_message(BitStream ref) {
this.send_message = ref;
}
private AES kEnc;
public void setkEnc(AES ref) {
this.kEnc = ref;
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}
public void doProtocol()
throws java.beans.PropertyVetoException,
EnsureFailedException, UnmarshallingException,
FailException {
BitStream ciphertext;
this.setState(1);
ciphertext = kEnc.encrypt(send_message);
this.setState(2);
this.getB().send(ciphertext);
this.setState(3);
this.getB().send(KAut.MAC_generate(ciphertext));
this.setState(4);
// nothing to do in this state for this Party
this.setState(5);
// nothing to do in this state for this Party
}
}
B.2 Class File for EncryptThenAuthenticate B.java
import cryptort.*;
import cryptort.exceptions.*;
public class EncryptThenAuthenticate_B extends cryptort.CryptoSystem {
public EncryptThenAuthenticate_B() {
super();
}
public void init() { }
private OMAC KAut;
public void setKAut(OMAC ref) {
this.KAut = ref;
}
private BitStream receive_message;
public BitStream getreceive_message() {
return this.receive_message;
}
private Party A;
public void setA(Party ref) {
this.A = ref;
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}
private AES kEnc;
public void setkEnc(AES ref) {
this.kEnc = ref;
}
public void doProtocol()
throws java.beans.PropertyVetoException,
EnsureFailedException, UnmarshallingException,
FailException {
BitStream c_txt;
M.Tag aut_tag;
this.setState(1);
// nothing to do in this state for this Party
this.setState(2);
BitStream bs_2 = this.getA().receive();
c_txt = bs_2;
this.setState(3);
BitStream bs_3 = this.getA().receive();
aut_tag = M.Tag.getFromBitStream(bs_3);
if (!(aut_tag.getSize() >= 40))
throw new EnsureFailedException(1, "aut_tag");
if (!bs_3.isEmpty())
throw new UnmarshallingException
("possible buffer overflow attack");
this.setState(4);
if (KAut.MAC_verify(c_txt,aut_tag) == 0) {
throw new FailException(1);
}
this.setState(5);
receive_message = kEnc.decrypt(c_txt);
}
}
Appendix C
Extended Backus-Naur-Form
The formal notation of the LaCoDa specification language is given in EBNF
form in this appendix. The Table C.1 lists the reserved words of the LaCoDa
language. In addition, the Table C.2 explains the symbols and operators
used in the EBNF notation.
In the EBNF notation, the reserved words are written in typewriter font
(Example: “RESERVEDWORD”) and the symbols and operators are written in
bold font (Example: “OPERATOR”).
PARAM VAR FUNCTION
RETURN SYSTEM OPTIONS
COMPILER PARSER DEF
IN OUT INOUT
BLOCK BEGIN END
IF THEN ELSE
ENDIF ASSERT ENSURE
FAIL NEW TEMPLATE
NOT SHARED MESSAGES
REPEAT UNTIL
Table C.1: The Reserved Words
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| Either-Or relation
? optional element
+ one or more instances exist
? none, one or more instances exist
ASSIGN :=
ARROW ->
SEMI ;
COLON :
COMMA ,
DOT .
LAREA {
RAREA }
LRND (
RRND )
LSQ [
RSQ ]
GT >
LT <
EQ =
LE <=
GE >=
NE <>
PLUS +
MINUS -
MUL ?
DIV /
MOD %
POWER ˆ
AND &&
OR ||
Table C.2: The symbols and operators used in the EBNF specification
APPENDIX C. EXTENDED BACKUS-NAUR-FORM 145
1 Sta r t := ( ( EOF | SEMI ) | ( Options )? SystemDeclaration )
2 Options := OPTIONS LAREA
3 ( ParserOptions )? ( CompilerOptions )?
4 RAREA
5 CompilerOptions := COMPILER LAREA
6 ( Compi le rOpt ionDef in i t ion )+
7 RAREA
8 Compi le rOpt ionDef in i t ion := Ident i f i e rWithDots LAREA
9 ( CompilerOption )∗
10 RAREA
11 CompilerOption := ( I d e n t i f i e r ) COLON ( S t r i n gO r I d e n t i f i e r ) SEMI
12 ParserOptions := PARSER LAREA ( ParserOption )+ RAREA
13 ParserOption := ( I d e n t i f i e r ) COLON ( I d e n t i f i e r ) SEMI
14 SystemDeclaration := SYSTEM ( I d e n t i f i e r ) LAREA
15 SymbolTable MESSAGES LAREA
16 ( MessageOrRepeat )∗
17 RAREA
18 RAREA
19 SymbolTable := ( TemplateDeclarat ions ( SEMI )? )∗
20 ( SharedParameterBlock ( SEMI )? )?
21 ( ParameterBlock ( SEMI )? )∗ ( Var iab leBlock ( SEMI )? )∗
22 TemplateDeclarations := TEMPLATE LAREA
23 ( TemplateDeclaration )∗ ( Cons t r a in tDec la r a t i on )∗
24 RAREA
25 TemplateDeclaration := VariableWithoutMethodInvocation
26 (COMMA VariableWithoutMethodInvocation )∗ COLON
27 I d e n t i f i e r SEMI
28 Cons t r a in tDec la r a t i on := Asser t ionStatement | EnsureStatement
29 Asser t ionStatement := ASSERT LRND
30 Ident i f i e rWithDots COMMA Ident i f i e rWithDotsOrConstant
31 RelationSymbol Ident i f i e rWithDotsOrConstant
32 RRND SEMI
33 EnsureStatement := ENSURE LRND
34 Ident i f i e rWithDots COMMA Ident i f i e rWithDotsOrConstant
35 RelationSymbol Ident i f i e rWithDotsOrConstant
36 COMMA INTEGER_LITERAL
37 RRND SEMI
38 SharedParameterBlock := PARAM SHARED LAREA
39 ( SharedParameterDeclaration )∗
40 RAREA
41 SharedParameterDeclaration := IN VariableWithoutMethodInvocation
42 (COMMA VariableWithoutMethodInvocation )∗ COLON
43 Ident i f i e rWithDots SEMI
44
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45 ParameterBlock := PARAM VariableWithoutMethodInvocation LAREA
46 ( ParameterDeclaration | SharedDec la rat ion )∗
47 RAREA
48 ParameterDeclaration := ( IN | OUT | INOUT )
49 VariableWithoutMethodInvocation
50 (COMMA VariableWithoutMethodInvocation )∗ COLON
51 Ident i f i e rWithDots SEMI
52 SharedDec la rat ion := SHARED VariableWithoutMethodInvocation
53 (COMMA VariableWithoutMethodInvocation )∗ SEMI
54 Var iab leBlock := VAR ( VariableWithoutMethodInvocation ) LAREA
55 ( Var i ab l eDec la r a t i on )∗
56 RAREA
57 Var iab l eDec la r a t i on := VariableWithoutMethodInvocation
58 (COMMA VariableWithoutMethodInvocation )∗ COLON
59 Ident i f i e rWithDots SEMI
60 MessageOrRepeat := Message | Repeat
61 Message := ExternalMessage | Interna lMessage
62 RepeatPart := I d e n t i f i e r
63 RepeatCondition := UNTIL I d e n t i f i e r COLON OrExpression
64 Repeat := LRND RepeatParty (COLON RepeatParty )∗ RRNDCOLON
65 REPEAT
66 (MessageOrRepeat )∗ ( RepeatCondition )+
67 END REPEAT SEMI
68 Interna lMessage := I d e n t i f i e r COLON Express ionOrIfStatement
69 ExternalMessage := I d e n t i f i e r ARROW I d e n t i f i e r COLON
70 Express ion ARROW VariableNoObject SEMI
71 VariableNoObject := I d e n t i f i e r
72 Express ionOrIfStatement := Fai lStatement | I fStatement
73 | ( Expres s ion SEMI )
74 Express ionOrI fStatementFor I f := Fai lStatement | I fStatement
75 | ( Expres s ion SEMI )
76 Fai lStatement := FAIL LRND Express ion RRND SEMI
77 BlockStatement := SymbolTable BLOCK BlockVar
78 BEGIN Begin
79 END BLOCK
80 Begin := (Message )∗
81 BlockVar := ( B lo ckVar i ab leDec la rat i on )∗
82 BlockVar i ab l eDec la rat i on := VariableWithoutMethodInvocation
83 COLON VariableWithoutMethodInvocation COLON
84 Ident i f i e rWithDots SEMI
85 I fStatement := IF I fCond i t i on THEN
86 ThenBlock ( ELSE ElseBlock )?
87 ENDIF
88 I fCond i t i on := OrExpression
89
APPENDIX C. EXTENDED BACKUS-NAUR-FORM 147
90 ThenBlock := ( Expres s ionOrI fStatementFor I f )
91 (SEMI Express ionOrI fStatementFor I f )∗ ( SEMI )?
92 ElseBlock := ( Express ionOrIfStatement )
93 ( SEMI Express ionOrI fStatementFor I f )∗ ( SEMI )?
94 Express ion := ( Ass ignExpres s ion | OrExpression )
95 Ass ignExpres s ion := VariableWithoutMethodInvocationOrList
96 ASSIGN I n s t an t i a t i o nExp r e s s i o n
97 I n s t an t i a t i o nExp r e s s i o n := ( NEW I d e n t i f i e r LRND ArgumentList RRND )
98 | ( OrExpression )
99 OrExpression := AndExpression ( OR AndExpression )∗
100 AndExpression := EqualExpress ion ( AND EqualExpress ion )∗
101 EqualExpress ion := Re la t i ona lExpr e s s i on
102 ( ( NE Re la t i ona lExpr e s s i on ) | ( EQ Re la t i ona lExpr e s s i on ) )∗
103 Re la t i ona lExpr e s s i on := Addit iveExpres s ion
104 ( ( LT Addit iveExpres s ion ) | ( GT Addit iveExpres s ion ) |
105 ( LE Addit iveExpres s ion ) | ( GE Addit iveExpres s ion ) )∗
106 Addit iveExpres s ion := Mu l t i p l i c a t i v eExp r e s s i o n
107 ( ( PLUS Mul t i p l i c a t i v eExp r e s s i o n ) |
108 ( MINUS Mul t i p l i c a t i v eExp r e s s i o n ) )∗
109 Mul t i p l i c a t i v eExp r e s s i o n := UnaryExpression
110 ( ( MUL UnaryExpression ) | ( DIV UnaryExpression ) |
111 ( MOD UnaryExpression ) )∗
112 UnaryExpression := ( PLUS UnaryExpression ) |
113 ( MINUS UnaryExpression ) | ( NOT UnaryExpression ) |
114 UnaryExpressionNotPlusMinus
115 UnaryExpressionNotPlusMinus := L i s tExpr e s s i on | AnyConstant |
116 VariableWithMethodInvocation | LRND I n s t an t i a t i o nExp r e s s i o n RRND
117 ArgumentList := ( Argument ( COMMA Argument )∗ )?
118 Argument := In s t an t i a t i o nExp r e s s i o n
119 Li s tExpr e s s i on := LSQ VariableWithoutMethodInvocation
120 ( COMMA VariableWithoutMethodInvocation )∗ RSQ
121 VariableWithoutMethodInvocationOrList := L i s tExpr e s s ion |
122 VariableWithoutMethodInvocation
123 VariableWithoutMethodInvocation := I d e n t i f i e r
124 VariableWithMethodInvocation := I d e n t i f i e r ( ( MethodInvocation ) )?
125 MethodInvocation := DOT I d e n t i f i e r LRND ArgumentList RRND
126 ( MethodInvocation )?
127 AnyConstant := INTEGER_LITERAL
128 S t r i n gO r I d e n t i f i e r := S t r i n gL i t e r a l | I d e n t i f i e r
129 S t r i n gL i t e r a l := STRING_LITERAL
130 I d e n t i f i e r := IDENTIFIER1
131 Ident i f i e rWithDots := IDENTIFIER1 ( DOT IDENTIFIER1 )∗
132 Ident i f i e rWithDotsOrConstant := INTEGER_LITERAL | Ident i f i e rWithDots
133 RelationSymbol := EQ | LT | GT | LE | GE | NE
